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ABSTRACT 
For over two decades Congress has made several efforts aimed at 
improving financial visibility throughout the federal government. Responses from 
Department of Defense (DoD) have been criticized by Congress for not meeting 
requirements. In December 2005, the DoD released the Financial Improvement 
and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan. This plan is intended to integrate the individual 
efforts by DoD agencies into a coherent and comprehensive plan which aims to 
improve financial management within the Department, address Congressional 
mandates, and pass independent verification through audit. This analysis seeks 
to address two questions. Does the FIAR Plan create value through the 
integration of politics, substance, and administration? If so, can this change effort 
be sustained over the long-term? Previously published academic frameworks for 
evaluating public sector organizations will be used for each question. Benefits of 
this study will identify elements of value created by the FIAR Plan and 
recommendations improving perceived benefits to stakeholders. Second, it will 
provide an assessment of the risks to sustaining the change processes required 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Financial management reform has been an issue the Department of 
Defense (DoD) has struggled with for many years. Congress has attempted to 
obtain better visibility of the government’s financial position through a series of 
laws and mandates. These laws included the: 
• Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) of 1982; 
• Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990; 
• Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993; 
• Government Management and Reform Act (GMRA) of 1994; 
• Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA) of 1996. 
This series of laws defines the current requirement for the production of 
business-like financial statements and reports, which represent the federal 
agency’s financial position and performance. Furthermore, they must be verified 
by an independent audit. 
Since the passage of the CFO Act most of the federal agencies required 
to do so have been able to produce financial statements backed up with 
unqualified opinions from auditors. The DoD has not been one of them. The DoD 
and most of its component agencies (such as the Army, Navy, and Air Force) 
have received only disclaimed opinions on their audits. Stated simply, the 
financial information produced by the Department and its agencies cannot be 
verified to be reliable or accurate and calls into question the management of 
financial resources. 
Efforts were made by the DoD to correct the discrepancies in its financial 
systems and internal control in order to obtain an unqualified opinion on the 
audits. Most of these early efforts had the DoD components attempting to solve 
their problems on their own. In 2002 the Financial Management Modernization 
Program (FMMP) was started to aid in the coordination of improvement 
programs. This evolved into the Business Management Modernization Program 
(BMMP) and finally into the Business Transformation Agency (BTA) in 2006. 
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The problems with financial systems throughout the DoD turned out to be 
much larger and complex than originally thought. By December 2005 a new plan 
was released by the DoD to coordinate the efforts of the various components and 
set the roadmap for the Department to improve its financial infrastructure and 
achieve an unqualified opinion on its financial statements. This is the Financial 
Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan. The FIAR Plan supports the 
Financial Visibility transformation goals under the Enterprise Transition Plan 
(ETP). The first release of the Plan was in December 2005. There have been 
updates released in June and September 2006.  
The FIAR Plan is administered by the FIAR Directorate, which resides in 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)), under the 
Deputy CFO. Strategic goals and focus areas are set by the FIAR Committee. It 
is chaired by the DCFO, and has representation from USD(C), the Military 
Departments, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service (DFAS), and the BTA.  
Execution of the FIAR Plan is accomplished through the individual 
component Financial Improvement Plans (FIPs). Intermediate line-item goals are 
known as Key Milestone Plans (KMPs). Financial improvements are focused on 
the following capabilities: 
• Forecast, plan, program, and budget; 
• Manage financial assets and liabilities; 
• Funds allocation, collection, disbursement, and control; 
• Manage general ledger; 
• Managerial accounting; 
• Financial reporting. 
Focus Areas are set by the FIAR Committee. Areas are chosen for their 
material impact on the balance sheet. Currently they are: Military Equipment, 
Real Property, Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund, Environmental 
Liabilities, Operating Materials and Supplies, Accounts Payable, Account 
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Receivable. In addition to the Focus Areas, four Priority areas were added: Fund 
Balance with Treasury, U.S. Marine Corps, Military Pay, and Military Obligations. 
The FIAR Plan also established a process monitored by the FIAR 
Directorate for components to get an assertion for audits. This is a five-step 
process. 





Projection for completion of component audits is 2017 as of the 
September 2006 release of the FIAR Plan. 
A fundamental question that arises from this plan is; does such a plan 
create value for the various stakeholders in and around the Department? To 
examine this, a framework developed by Mark Moore of the Harvard Business 
School was chosen to focus on value creation from a public organization. The 
Moore Model recognizes that there are various stakeholders which exert different 
forces upon public organizations for different reasons. He simplifies the model by 
categorizing stakeholders into three distinct directions; up, out, and down. 
Visualizing the manager in the center, he must provide value upward as defined 
by the political system which provides the mandates and resources to perform 
functions. He must provide value outward by providing results which the public 
defines as valuable. He must provide value downward into the organization by 
effectively managing its operations. Thus, value creation is derived from the 
integration of politics, substance, and administration. 
Using this model it was determined that the FIAR Plan does achieve this 
integration. Summing the findings of value creation: 
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• Up – It sets the roadmap for compliance with Congressional 
mandates. It also tracks milestones to demonstrate that progress is 
being made. The FIAR Plan has been viewed as a positive step by 
Congress, the GAO, DoD IG, and OMB.  
• Out – For the public the FIAR Plan provides a visible demonstration 
that the DoD is working to improve its financial systems. Eventually, 
with the unqualified opinion, it will provide an independent 
assessment that financial processes are working well. The value 
created is improved confidence in the conduct of the organization. 
Thus, the auditor’s opinion on the financial statements is important. 
For the DoD components, the financial improvements made will 
improve the information used for decision making.  
• Down – The FIAR Plan adds value for the financial management 
community by providing a common framework from which to make 
their improvements. Accountability is more visible across the 
components with the use of the FIAR Planning Tool and reporting. 
It also provides the systematic process for preparing for audit. 
While the FIAR Plan does create the value, as stated above, there are 
items that could be better enhanced within the FIAR Plan in order to realize 
potential further benefits. These are: 
• Working with political leadership to take advantage of future 
financial visibility; 
• Improved visibility to changes in the Plan so overseers have less 
reason to question the sincerity or execution of the Plan; 
• Seeking progress metrics that non-financial managers can 
understand and appreciate; 
• Make the relevance of financial information just as important as the 
timeliness, accuracy, and reliability of it; 
• Including the transformation of financial managers as people to 
handle the transformation of systems and processes. 
A second fundamental question that arises is; if the FIAR Plan creates 
value, then is it a strategy that can be sustained over the long-term? To address 
this a second framework was chosen which was developed by Sergio Fernandez 
of Indiana University and Hal Rainey of the University of Georgia. They derived 
eight factors for successful change processes within public organizations. The 
eight success factors are: 
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• Ensure top management commitment; 
• Build external support; 
• Ensure the need; 
• Build internal support; 
• Provide resources; 
• Institutionalize change; 
• Pursue comprehensive change;  
• Provide a plan. 
The factors were used to evaluate the environment under which the FIAR 
Plan is being implemented by applying a risk analysis. Findings indicate that top 
management support and external support are high risk areas. This is due to the 
questionable support from non-politically appointed leadership, especially from 
those with non-financial backgrounds. Additionally, with the upcoming elections 
in 2008 there is no guarantee that the next administration will have the same 
priority with regard to financial reform. The effects of the recent 2006 
Congressional election are uncertain. Without support from the current civilian 
and military leadership, the risk of a priority shift increases.  
The next five factors were medium risk areas. The FIAR Plan’s inclusion 
of component FIPs helps to ensure support from within and encourage the 
changes required. But it does risk reprioritization at the component level which 
could upset the Plan at the macro level. 
Using another study by Douglas Brook it was determined that support of 
top management, internal support, external support, and the provision of 
resources are the most critical elements. Efforts focused in these areas would 
likely have the greatest impact on sustainability. Additionally, these factors 
require that a focus on people is critical for sustained changes to succeed.  
It is worth noting that these two elements, value and sustainability, are 
mutually supportive. Those activities which create value will promote 
sustainment. Likewise, those activities which ensure sustainment will increase 
value. This correlation can also be applied to the two models used for this 
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analysis. Moore’s UP direction (Political System) matches to the 
Fernandez/Rainey factors of ensuring the need, external support, comprehensive 
change and provision of resources. Value created in this direction will aid DoD 
FM increased political legitimacy and financial support. Interactive involvement 
with political authorizers can be critical to long-term success as was seen with 
the New Zealand government’s change in accounting systems. 
Moore’s OUT direction (Receivers and Payers of Services) aligns with the 
Fernandez/Rainey factors of ensuring the need, external support and 
comprehensive change. It is worth noting again that the root of value is in the 
perceived desires of the individual. A successful plan requires having knowledge 
of what value needs to be created before making the change. An understanding 
of how these stakeholders use financial information is critical to providing the 
right value. With that, support will follow. 
Moore’s DOWN direction (Organization) aligns with the Fernandez/Rainey 
factors of ensuring the need, providing a plan, internal support, top management 
support, institutionalize change and comprehensive change. What becomes 
clearer when combining the two models in this direction is the importance of the 
human element in creating value and sustained change. Achieving the value 
potential UP and OUT requires the organization to make sustained changes 
within itself. This is as much a leadership and education challenge as it is a 
system and process challenge.  
To summarize, the FIAR Plan is a comprehensive change strategy that 
does create value for DoD stakeholders. However, there is potential for greater 
value creation by greater focus on the perceived desires and expectations of 
those stakeholders. The FIAR Plan appears to be at high risk for long-term 
success mainly due to questionable buy-in from civilian and military leaders, 
along with an uncertain political environment. Efforts should be focused on 
inclusion of a human capital strategy to supplement the FIAR Plan focus on 
financial systems and processes, and securing the support for FIAR Plan 
objectives from civilian and military leadership. 
1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
 Financial management reform has been an issue the Department of 
Defense (DoD) has struggled with for many years. Congress, in its oversight role 
of federal programs, has attempted to obtain better visibility of the government’s 
financial position through a series of laws and mandates designed to improve the 
accountability and management of appropriated resources. During the 1990s, a 
string of laws was passed and signed which further defined what Congress 
wanted; the production of business-like financial statements and reports which 
represented the federal agency’s financial position and performance, verified by 
an independent audit. 
 Since the passage of the Chief Financial Officers Act (CFO Act) in 1990, 
most of the federal agencies required to do so have been able to produce 
financial statements backed up with unqualified opinions from auditors. The DoD 
has not been one of them. For the last 12 years the DoD and most of its 
component agencies (such as the Army, Navy, and Air Force) have received 
disclaimed opinions on their audits. Stated simply, the financial information 
produced by the Department and its agencies cannot be verified to be reliable or 
accurate.  
 Efforts have been made by the DoD to correct the discrepancies in its 
financial systems and internal control in order to obtain an unqualified opinion on 
the audits. Most of these early efforts had the DoD components attempting to 
solve their problems on their own. This did not work. The problems with financial 
systems throughout the DoD turned out to be much larger and complex than 
originally thought. By December 2005 a new plan was released by the DoD to 
coordinate the efforts of the various components and set the roadmap for the 
Department to improve its financial infrastructure and achieve an unqualified 
opinion on its financial statements. This is the Financial Improvement and Audit 
Readiness (FIAR) Plan, and the subject of this study. 
 
2 
B.  SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE 
 The overall objective of this analysis was to examine two major questions 
with relation to the FIAR Plan. The first, does the FIAR Plan create value, in the 
sense that it helps to meet desires and expectations of stakeholders concerned? 
Second, if it does create value, then can the changes required of the FIAR Plan 
be sustained over the long-term? This was a qualitative analysis based on 
historical documents, opinion papers, academic research, and interviews. 
 The FIAR Plan is a relatively new approach to helping solve what has 
become a prolonged problem. The intent of this analysis was to do two things. 
First, provide a look at the program from an academic perspective which may 
highlight issues in a different way for the reader. It is hoped this will stimulate 
further thought and discussion. Second, provide a foundation for further study of 
financial management reform and business transformation issues within the DoD. 
Benefits of this study include the identification of value elements created by the 
FIAR Plan and recommendations for improving perceived benefits to 
stakeholders. Second, it provides an assessment of the risks to sustaining the 
change processes required of the FIAR Plan and provides recommendations for 
focus to high risk areas.   
 This research was to make a careful examination of what the FIAR Plan is 
and its potential impacts at the macro level. Financial management within the 
DoD is very complex with an enormous amount of moving parts. Detailed 
analysis of specific line items within the FIAR Plan was beyond the scope of this 
research. Additionally, as will be explained in Chapter III, the FIAR Plan is reliant 
on financial improvement programs run by the individual DoD components to 
perform the execution of the plan. Analysis of those plans was also beyond the 
scope of this research.   
 There are 19 different agencies within the DoD that are required to 
produce auditable financial statements. Research into the DoD components was 
focused on the three major agencies (Army, Navy, and Air Force) which together 
are responsible for over 80% of the DoD’s yearly budget.  
 
3 
C.  METHODOLOGY 
 The methodology of work began with a background discussion of the 
legislation, regulations, and issues which led up to the development of the FIAR 
Plan. Included is a detailed discussion of the FIAR Plan’s organization, goals, 
methodology, and progress to date.  
 Two frameworks were applied to the FIAR Plan in this study to examine to 
the two main questions. The Moore Public Value framework was used to address 
the first question concerning the value of the Plan. It is a framework based on 
public institutions and the forces which act upon the managers as they attempt to 
create value for the various stakeholders of the organization. A detailed 
description of the framework precedes analysis. That is followed by an 
application of the model to the DoD Financial Management (FM) community so 
as to assess the value creation for the various stakeholders by the FIAR Plan. 
The second framework, the Fernandez/Rainey Success Factors for 
Change, was used to address the sustainability of the change process required 
of the FIAR Plan. This framework is also geared for application to public 
organizations. A detailed description precedes analysis. The model establishes 
eight significant factors to the success of a change process within a public 
organization. This study applied those factors to the environment the FIAR Plan 
operates in, to generate a risk assessment of the long-term success of the plan. 
Data used for this study were obtained through numerous sources. These 
included academic works related to Defense financial management, governance, 
politics, change theories, organizational behavior, and strategic thinking. Data 
were also collected from reports released by the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG), as 
well as numerous articles from professional periodicals and newspapers.  
One trip was conducted to San Diego to attend the 2006 Professional 
Development Institute (PDI) Conference sponsored by the American Society of 
Military Comptrollers (ASMC). Data were collected through attending numerous 
briefs and lectures related to the FIAR Plan and other transformation efforts 
throughout the DoD.  
4 
Interviews were conducted via phone and e-mail with several high-level 
financial managers at the Pentagon who are involved directly with 
implementation the FIAR Plan. These managers represented the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force offices for financial management. An attempt was made to 
interview someone involved with the FIAR Directorate, but there was no 
response. To promote a candid discussion of the environment in which the 
respondents work, anonymity was granted for their responses, and they will not 
be cited directly. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
 This analysis begins in Chapter II with a review of the historical legislation 
and regulations which led up to the creation of the FIAR Plan. This includes the 
major Congressional legislation which applies to almost all of the federal 
agencies. There is also a review of some of the programs that the DoD 
undertook to achieve compliance prior to the FIAR Plan. 
 Chapter III provides a detailed overview of the FIAR Plan itself. There is a 
description of how it organized and how it relates to the bigger transformation 
efforts currently underway within the DoD. The goals of the Plan are discussed, 
as well as its methodology and progress since its release. 
 Chapter IV evaluates the first major issue, value creation. An overview of 
the Moore framework is provided. That is followed by an application to the FIAR 
Plan. Finally, there is discussion of the value created by the Plan in relation to the 
model.  
 Chapter V presents the second major issue, sustainability of the FIAR 
Plan. An overview of the Fernandez/Rainey framework is provided. That is 
followed by a risk assessment of the FIAR Plan’s sustainability based on the 
framework’s success factors. A detailed discussion of the rationale behind the 
assessment follows. 
 Chapter VI presents a summary of conclusions from the analysis. This 




E.  ACCOUNTING DEFINTIONS 
 Much of the subject matter in this study deals with issues that relate to 
accounting. Accounting has its own language with terms that may be unfamiliar 
to the reader. The following are some basic terms that will be referred to in the 
report.  
1. Accounting Types 
 There are three types of accounting to consider when talking about 
financial management in the DoD. They are Budgetary Accounting, Financial 
Accounting, and Managerial Accounting.  
 Budgetary accounting is used almost exclusively by government agencies. 
It is not used in the private sector. It supports the process of budget formulation 
and execution. The purpose of this system is to ensure compliance with budget 
law. It accounts for funds being spent on what was intended by legislators 
(purpose), within a designated period (time), and within fiscal constraints 
(amount).1 The focus is on ensuring the transactions conform to purpose, time, 
and amount. Not necessarily on the product or service being bought. 
 Financial accounting is the system used in the private sector. In the 
government sector this is often referred to as proprietary accounting. This is the 
system used to produce financial statements. It follows strict rules called 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Its focus is on the accurate 
and reliable recording and presentation of historical events.2 It accounts for 
assets, liabilities and cash flows. Financial accounting uses an accrual basis 
where revenue is recognized when realized, and expenses are recognized when 
incurred.3 The purpose is to provide accurate, reliable, and timely visibility to the 
organization’s financial position. 
 Managerial accounting is for internal use to the organization. Its 
information is not intended for external users. Thus, there are no set rules. But, 
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there are established standards and techniques which management can employ. 
The focus of managerial accounting is on providing information for management 
decisions and monitoring internal controls.4 Managerial accounting is also called 
cost accounting.  
 For the DoD, all three types of accounting are used. The primary type, and 
the one most familiar to users within the Department, is budgetary. Proprietary 
accounting is required to produce the financial statements, and is less 
established in the DoD accounting culture, as is managerial accounting. 
2. Audits 
 Audits are independent examinations of an organization’s accounting 
information. The responsibility of producing the financial statements rests with 
the organization’s management. The auditor’s job is just to render an opinion as 
to whether the statements fairly represent the organization’s financial position 
and are in conformance with GAAP. Auditors must follow a set a rules known as 
Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS). There are four 
opinions that can be rendered by the auditor. 
• Unqualified – Also referred to as a “clean” opinion. This states that 
the financial statements represent fairly in all material respects, the 
financial position of the organization and are in keeping with GAAP.  
• Qualified – This states that, except for the effect of matters 
pertaining to qualifiers, the financial statements represent fairly in 
all material respects, the financial position of the organization and 
are in keeping with GAAP. 
• Disclaimer of opinion – Also known as a disclaimed opinion. This 
states that the auditor cannot express an opinion on the financial 
statements. This is rendered when the scope of the audit is not 
sufficient to provide enough information to make an opinion. 
• Adverse – This states that the financial statements do not represent 
fairly the financial position of the organization due to 
nonconformance with GAAP.5  
 
                                            
4 Phillip J. Candreva, “Accounting for Transformation” in The Armed Forces Comptroller. (Fall 
2004) 9. 
5 Charles H. Gibson, Financial Reporting Analysis: Using Financial Accounting Information, 
10th Ed (Thomson South-Western: 2007) 50. 
7 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A.  FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT UP TO THE 1990’S 
 Financial management in the Federal Government has been a major issue 
for national leaders and the public since the early days of the Republic. Thomas 
Jefferson made a prophetic statement to his Secretary of Treasury, Albert 
Gallatin, in 1802, 
We might hope to see the finances of the Union as clear and 
intelligible as a merchant’s book, so that every member of 
Congress and every man of any mind in the Union should be able 
to comprehend them…I hope…that by our honest and judicious 
reformations, we may be able…to bring things back to that simple 
and intelligible system on which they should have been organized 
at first.6 
This goes to show that managing the funds of the country has always been a 
major concern, if not an intolerable frustration. But, it set the standard of financial 
management for which federal officials should strive. It is also the standard that is 
yet to be achieved; an intelligible system that produces information everyone can 
understand and trust.  
For the last 200-plus years there have been several major landmark 
reforms which have shaped and evolved how government finances are handled. 
But, it is the initiatives of the last 30 years which have led to several reform 
measures throughout the federal government that have a large impact on how 
the Department currently conducts its business. The current initiative specific to 
the Department of Defense is the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness 
Plan. 
 During the 1960’s the pace of change in the federal government 
quickened with an explosion of new federal programs. Integrated financial 
management systems failed to keep up with those rapid changes happening 
within the federal government. Ad hoc tracking systems were developed so 
managers “in the trenches” could complete daily tasks. Focus shifted, especially 
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in the Department of Defense, on figuring out what to spend money on (i.e. 
budgeting and budget accounting) and less on how the money was spent (or 
more specifically, what was bought and the return on money spent). 
 By the early 1980’s, this lack of attention to, and resources for financial 
management had reached a point of criticality. The Reagan Administration took 
over the White House and found, “thousands of antiquated, duplicative 
management systems that could not provide even elementary government-wide 
management information to the President or his key managers.”7 The country 
was in a recession and the President’s economic policies emphasized the need 
for increased deficit spending within the government. The convoluted and 
antiquated accounting systems, along with a lack of internal controls, left the 
government vulnerable to cases of fraud, waste, and abuse. 
 There were initiatives already underway by the executive and legislative 
branches to rein in control financial management within the government. An 
important step was the passage of the Inspector General Act of 1978. This 
required the establishment of the Office of Inspector General (IG) in federal 
departments and agencies. These offices conducted independent investigations 
and audits of government agencies, supervised the work of non-federal 
(contracted) auditors, and aided in the establishment of federal auditing 
standards. It was after passage of this act, Federal IG’s were able to document 
many of the material weaknesses in financial internal controls within the 
departments and agencies.8  
 As the picture started to become clear about the state of financial 
management within the government, the President and Congress enacted the 
Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA). This act required 
federal agencies to make ongoing evaluations of accounting practices, internal 
controls, and note material weaknesses. These weaknesses were to be reported 
annually to the President and Congress by each agency. Reporting standards  
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were set by the Comptroller General of the Government Accounting Office 
(GAO). While this act mandated the reporting of weaknesses, it did not establish 
the framework for discrepancies to be fixed. 
 The FMFIA was one part of the President’s plan called the ‘Reform 88’ 
agenda, started in 1982, which was a multidimensional program to improve 
management information problems. Aside from the FMFIA, other initiatives were 
handled internally to the Executive Branch through the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB), working closely with the GAO. A push was made to 
modernize the accounting systems, strengthen internal controls, and provide 
more uniform financial information.  
 Despite the time, money, and manpower expended on these efforts, the 
results were lacking. Charles McAndrew, a Department of the Navy financial 
manager at the time, noted in 1990, “…financial management remains a pathetic 
disaster in most federal departments and agencies. While audit, IG, evaluation 
and FMFIA reports have found many material deficiencies, departments and 
agencies still fail to take corrective actions.”9 Amidst this environment, charges of 
fraud, waste, and abuse in the federal government continued to mount, and 
public perception of the government’s ability to manage its finances decreased.10  
B.  THE 1990’S AND CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION 
 By the end of the 1980s, financial management of government resources 
had become an issue which required an elevated level of attention at the 
Congressional level. With massive defense spending increases during the 
decade, large budget deficits, and numerous media and government reports of 
possible fraud and waste, the public and Congress demanded to know what was 
actually happening to tax dollars. 
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 In 1990 Congress firmly established its oversight role through a series of 
laws intended to increase the transparency of government management and 
cause the internal reforms necessary to better manage the people’s money. They 
found: 
Current financial reporting practices of the Federal Government do 
not accurately disclose the current and probable future cost of 
operating and investment decisions, including the future need for 
cash or other resources, do not permit adequate comparison of 
actual costs among executive agencies, and do not provide the 
timely information required for efficient management of programs.11 
This showed an unprecedented concern by Congress over the state of financial 
management within the government. The stage was set for the legislation which 
drives the political and operational environment government managers currently 
work in. 
1. The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 
The first of these laws was the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO 
Act). This was the first act which made a requirement for a federal agency to 
actually report on its financial position using financial statements similar to those 
of the private sector. It also required federal agencies to establish positions within 
their organizations to deal exclusively with financial issues.  
 In broad terms, the CFO Act was passed to achieve three overarching 
objectives. 
• Bring more effective general and financial management practices to 
the Federal Government; 
• Provide for the improvement of accounting systems, financial 
systems, and internal controls; 
• Require the production of financial statements for the use of the 
executive agencies and Congress for evaluation of performance.12 
The Act established several mechanisms to achieve these goals. The first 
was establishment of the Office of Federal Financial Management inside of OMB. 
It was to be headed by a new Deputy Director of Management, appointed by the 
                                            




President. This office was intended to spearhead and coordinate the massive, 
but now dedicated, effort required to clean up the financial systems and practices 
across all of the federal agencies. 
The next mechanism was the requirement that all federal departments and 
agencies establish Chief Financial Officers (CFO) within each organization. 
These offices were to coordinate financial management reforms within the 
individual departments and agencies. 
The Act also established the formation of the CFO Council. It was to be 
headed by the Deputy Director for Management and include all of the individual 
government CFOs. This council was to meet periodically to coordinate efforts for 
improvement, including system modernization, data and reporting standards, 
internal controls, and legal requirements.13 
The part of the Act which was to have the most profound impact on the 
government was the establishment of a pilot program which would require certain 
agencies of the government to produce audited financial statements. OMB was 
given the latitude to dictate the format and content of the statements. But, they 
were required to include: 
• The overall financial position of the department / agency; 
• The results of operations; 
• Cash flows or changes in the financial position; 
• Reconciliation to the budget reports.14 
These statements were to be audited by the Inspector General of the agency or 
an external auditor designated by the IG. This pilot program affected the 
following agencies: 
• Department of Agriculture 
• Department of Labor 
• Department of Veterans Affairs 
• The General Services Administration 
• The Social Security Administration 
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• Department of Housing and Urban Development 
• Department of the Army 
• Department of the Air Force 
• The Internal Revenue Service 
• The United States Customs Service 
The pilot was to run until March, 1993, and OMB was to deliver a final report to 
Congress by 30 June, 1993. 
 The CFO Act was a landmark piece of legislation. It began the process of 
improving management within the government through reporting. The theory 
being that agencies would have to clean up their financial systems and practices 
in order to generate an auditable statement. It also had the backing of law.  
2. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 
 The next piece of landmark legislation was the Government Performance 
and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993. This required government agencies to link their 
performance to the goals they achieved, or failed to achieve. It was to make 
officials shift their thinking from a process-based organization to a results-based 
one.  
 The Act required government agencies to develop long-range strategic 
plans which were to be submitted to OMB and the Congress starting at the 
beginning of FY98 and every three years thereafter. These strategic plans were 
to include: 
• A comprehensive mission statement; 
• Outcome related goals and objectives for each major function; 
• A description of how the objectives were to be achieved; 
• Identification of key external factors which could affect 
performance; 
• Cover a period of five years from the fiscal year it was submitted.15 
The Act also set in motion the requirement to submit annual performance 
plans and reports. These plans and reports were to show performance goals and 
objectives in measurable terms. This was to “improve congressional decision 
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making by providing more objective information on achieving statutory objectives, 
and on the relative effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and 
spending.”16 It provided a not-so-subtle hint for federal managers to start thinking 
about performance results or their programs might be subject to future cuts.  
OMB was given great latitude in implementing the Act. It was directed to 
designate agencies of its choosing for three pilot projects. These pilots were for 
performance goals, managerial accountability and flexibility, and performance 
budgeting. Applicability of the performance reports was made mandatory 
government-wide in 1999. That has since led to the development of the 
President’s Management Agenda (PMA) Scorecard compiled by OMB to track 
the progress and performance of the federal agencies. The performance 
budgeting pilot ended in 2001 and has not been incorporated into the federal 
budgeting process due to results falling short of being able to convince Congress 
and OMB that a change would be worthwhile.17 
3. The Government Management and Reform Act of 1994 
In late 1994, Congress passed the Government Management and Reform 
Act (GMRA) of 1994. This law expanded the applicability of the CFO Act to the 
remaining government agencies not included in the 1990 pilot program. All 24 
major federal agencies would now be required to submit annual audited financial 
statements. These statements were to be produced by March, 1997. Additionally, 
it required OMB to generate a consolidated financial statement of the entire 
federal government by March, 1998, which would be audited by the Comptroller 
General.18  
4. The Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 
 By 1996 Congress felt the need to further strengthen and clarify its 
intentions with regards to financial reporting. Amongst Congress’ findings were: 
• Accounting standards had not been uniformly implemented across 
the agencies; 
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•  Accounting practices did not accurately report the full cost of 
programs or reflect the total liabilities of congressional actions; 
• Possible waste and abuse undermines the credibility of the 
government and reduces the confidence of the American people in 
the government’s ability to manage resources; 
• Progress had been made on management reform, but further 
improvement was required.19 
With this, Congress passed the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act 
(FFMIA) of 1996.  
 The FFMIA was intended to bolster the other legislation previously passed 
by mandating better use of accounting and reporting standards. In 1990 the 
Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) was established to set 
the equivalent of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for federal 
agencies. This was due to a need to differentiate between public and private 
sector accounting standards.  
It also called for management systems to be able to support the disclosure 
of the full costs associated with federal programs. Better monitoring of budget 
execution was required by the linking of spending with activity results in reports.  
FFMIA compliance required agencies to report on the status of their 
management systems and confirm they were meeting FASAB standards. If they 
were not in compliance, they were required to submit a timeline for compliance 
and the plan to fix discrepancies.20 Furthermore, the act also required the 
Inspector Generals and the GAO to include agency FFMIA compliance in reports 
to Congress. 21 Reports were to be submitted by 1997. In 1999, only 3 of the 24 
CFO Act agencies had financial systems in compliance.22 For 2005, the number 
of agencies in compliance had only climbed to 6 out of 24.23 See Figure 2-1. 
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Figure 2-1.  CFO Act Agencies Not in FFMIA Compliance 
 
C.  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE 
 Until 1991, all of the individual services and agencies within the DoD had 
their own accounting and pay services. In 1991, the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service (DFAS) was created. This agency was to consolidate many 
of the individual pay and accounting systems into one service. It reduced the 
number of accounting offices from 324 to 26, and personnel from 27,000 to just 
over 15,000. It is important to note that DFAS was not an outcome of the CFO 
Act. Prior to passage of the CFO Act, the DoD recognized that performance 
gains and cost savings could be realized from standardizing certain financial 
management functions and pulling them out of the services into an independent 
agency.  
 Regarding the requirements of the GPRA, the DoD may have had an 
easier time with compliance than other federal agencies. The Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)24 that DoD had used for decades 
to build long-range plans and budgets provided a good framework for 
incorporating elements of the GPRA and performance reports. The annual 
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performance report was incorporated into the programming phase of PPBS. The 
vehicle used for submitting DoD’s strategic plan with financial performance 
measures was President Clinton’s Bottom-Up Review, first published in 1993. 
This evolved into the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in 1997. It is an 
overarching document that includes many other elements besides financial. The 
Department was able to get permission from Congress to allow using this 
document as the strategic plan for GPRA compliance to be submitted every four 
years vice the three-year requirement of the Act. The services were then required 
to link their own strategic plans to the QDR.25 
1. The Friedman Report 
 Other initiatives within the Department continued to try improving systems 
and processes. However, results were slow in coming and disappointing in effect. 
Under the George W. Bush Administration, the Secretary of Defense 
commissioned an independent study to evaluate the status of financial 
management in the Department and recommend a direction for future action. 
This study was called “Transforming Department of Defense Financial 
Management: A Strategy For Change,” published in April, 2001. This is also 
known as the ‘Friedman Report’, named for the chairman of the study committee. 
 The study found 10 major situations and problems with the financial 
environment that needed to be addressed. They were: 
• An inability to consistently provide reliable financial and managerial 
data for effective decision making; 
• A lack of an overarching approach to financial management with 
disparate systems (accounting, financial, and feeder) hampered by 
lack of integration and standardization; 
• Overly complex data requirements driven by appropriation funding 
rules, elaborate policies and procedures, and outdated guidelines 
for excessively detailed tracking of expenditures; 
• Too many convoluted business processes which fail to streamline 
excessive process steps; 
• Changing federal financial management standards created a 
moving target for CFO Act compliance; 
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• Difficulty in obtaining financially based, outcome oriented 
management metrics which link financial management to DoD 
goals; 
• Inability to produce CFO Act compliant annual financial statements. 
• Disproportionate budget dollars appear to support non-value added 
activities; 
• Cultural bias toward the status quo, driven by disincentives for 
change, and short time frames for political appointees; 
•  A requirement for an infusion of personnel with technical and 
financial skill sets necessary to achieve integrated financial 
management systems.26 
While the study acknowledged that there were “positive projects” being 
undertaken, they were narrowly focused, lacked commitment from senior 
leaders, and were not part of a comprehensive plan.27 In essence, during the 10 
years since passage of the CFO Act, the DoD had not made sufficient 
improvements to its financial management that achieved the positive results 
intended by the congressional legislation. 
 The paper called for a “twin-track” approach to setting a new direction for 
the Department. Track 1 was to make the structural changes necessary to 
integrate systems, establish a centralized process, achieve clean opinions on 
audits, and ultimately provide relevant and reliable financial information. These 
changes would require an extended timeframe to complete and would need 
centralized oversight for standardization and integration.28 It was recommended 
that implementation be directed from the USD(C) through two offices under 
his/her control. The first would be the Financial & Management Information 
Integration Office, which would coordinate systems and standards development 
and be geared for Track 1 objectives.  
Track 2 was to provide “close-in” successes. It was intended to target 
projects that could provide high-value benefits inside and across the services to 
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demonstrate value of the approach.29 “Dashboard Metrics” were to be formulated 
based on the Secretary of Defense’s Critical Success Factors. This track would 
be managed under the USD(C)’s second office, the Management Initiatives 
Office, which would work with the DoD components with metric and project 
development.30 
The report states that there would be no quick fixes to the problems. This 
would be a prolonged process requiring cultural as well as systems changes. It 
also stressed that Congress and OMB would have to be part of the solution. 
Finally, it would require the active participation of the Secretary of Defense and 
his senior managers to make this process work.31 
2. The Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) 
 With the Friedman Report in hand, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
initiated the Financial Management Modernization Program (FMMP). It was later 
renamed the Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP). This 
program was to begin fixing many of the long standing problems associated DoD 
business processes, modernize financial systems, and do so in an integrated 
framework that reduced redundancy and promoted standardization. 
 The BMMP had two major goals and six objectives. They were: 
1. Provide timely, accurate, reliable information for business 
management; 
• Achieve an unqualified audit opinion on the FY2007 financial 
statements 
• Achieve total visibility and accurate valuation of assets including 
Operating Materials and Supplies (OM&S); inventory; and Property, 
Plant, and Equipment (PP&E) by 2007 
• Achieve total personnel visibility to include: active military, civilian 
employees, military retirees, and other U.S. federal personnel and 
contractors in a theater of operations by 2007 
• Provide DoD decision makers timely access to business 
information 
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2. Enable improved business operations; 
• Adopt a Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) for acquiring, 
managing, and providing material and personnel in support of 
operational forces 
• Systematically enable efficiency and productivity improvements to 
DoD business operators.32 
This program also created the position of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense 
(Financial Management) under the USD(C). 
 By April 2003, the initial version of the BEA was released. This was 
intended to create a common framework for consolidation and improvement of 
financial systems. As part of the process to formulate the BEA, the BMMP office 
took an inventory of financial and business systems in the Department. They 
uncovered 2,274 such systems. As part of the BEA, any new system or changes 
to current systems required the approval of the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller). 
 Proponents of the program argued that BMMP was getting DoD to move 
in the right direction concerning business processes. However, others were very 
critical of the results being produced. Despite the supposed controls with regard 
to financial systems, the number grew from 2,274 in 2004, to over 4,150 by the 
following year.33 This increase was likely due to becoming more aware of what 
systems were in place. Business modernization had been an area on the GAO’s 
High Risk list since 1995. Despite almost three years of existence and the 
introduction of the BEA, the BMMP had not improved that status.34 Additionally, it 
became very clear that the aggressive objective of achieving Department-wide 
audited financial statements would not be achievable until well after the 2007 
goal. 
3. The Business Transformation Agency 
 In October 2005, Congress was notified that the BMMP was to be 
reorganized into the Business Transformation Agency (BTA). It was felt that there 
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were too many individual service and other DoD agency transformation initiatives 
going on that they needed to be organized under one tent. The BTA was 
recognized as an official organization in February 2006.35 The mission statement 
for the BTA was: “Guide the transformation of business operations throughout 
the Department of Defense and deliver enterprise-level capabilities that align to 
our warfighter needs.”36 Transformation efforts were broken down into six 
Business Enterprise Priorities (BEPs). They are: 
• Personnel visibility; 
• Acquisition visibility; 
• Material visibility; 
• Real property accountability; 
• Common supplier engagement; 
• Financial visibility.37 
The BTA is still in existence and is the organization that is overseeing all of the 
transformation activities in the Department.  
4. A Need for A Plan 
 With the formation of the BTA it was recognized that there needed to be a 
comprehensive and realistic plan to achieve the financial aspects of the business 
transformation efforts. What had been tried in the past had not worked and 
current programs were not achieving results, and those failures were receiving 
an increasing amount of public scrutiny. This was the environment that created 
the requirement to develop the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness 
Plan. 
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III.  DOD’S FIAR PLAN 
A.  THE PLAN FORMATION 
 The following section is a description of the formation of the Financial 
Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan, its organization, goals, 
mechanics, and progress to date. 
1. Rationale 
 As stated in the previous chapter, with the evolution of business 
transformation in the Department, it became apparent that the problems with 
business systems and processes were much more extensive and complicated 
than first thought. In January, 2005, DoD’s business transformation became a 
new area added to the GAO’s High-Risk list to Congress. The Comptroller 
General noted: 
Although the Secretary of Defense and senior leaders have shown 
a commitment to business transformation, as evidenced by 
individual key initiatives related to acquisition reform, business 
modernization, and financial management, among others, little 
tangible evidence of actual improvement has been seen in DoD’s 
business operations to date. …(the) DoD has not taken the steps it 
needs to take to achieve and sustain business reform on a broad, 
strategic, department-wide and integrated basis.38 
With the formation of the BTA, all transformation efforts, not just financial, would 
be standardized under one roof. 
 Under the BMMP, which became the BTA, an Enterprise Transition Plan 
(ETP) was developed to cover all department-wide initiatives. However, 
individual component transition plans, some of which had been initiated in the 
late 1990s, were not discounted. Taken together, this became the standard 
Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) for the DoD. The BEA would set the 
standards and requirements for all future business systems in the Department. 
Planning an execution would be accomplished through a concept called Tiered  
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Accountability. This is an approach which divides planning and management of 
systems and initiatives between the enterprise, component, and program 
levels.39 
Included in the BEA are enterprise-wide standards which cover the priority 
areas. There are several systems and standards covered under the BEA. One of 
these is the Standard Financial Information Structure (SFIS) which supports the 
Financial Visibility BEP. By ensuring all financial systems are SFIS compliant, 
regardless of the origin of the system, the information being fed through the DoD 
will be standard and transferable. That includes interoperability between the 
other priority areas. The information construct is designed to link six information 
components; 
• Appropriation account information 
• Budget program information 
• Organizational information 
• Transactional information 
• Trading partner information 
• Cost accounting information40 
SFIS is being incorporated into all new financial system projects. Eventually it will 
be required for all operating financial systems. 
 With regard to the financial requirements for the BEA, a single integrated 
plan needed to be devised to coordinate the transformation efforts of the various 
components and agencies. The Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness 
(FIAR) Plan was first released in December 2005. Since that initial release, there 
were updates to the Plan released in June 2006, and the latest in September 
2006.  
2. Organization 
 It is important to note, that the FIAR Plan is not just a written document, 
but it is part of an organization within the Department. The FIAR Directorate 
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resides with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)), and reports 
through the Deputy Chief Financial Officer (DCFO). The Directorate is 
responsible for managing the FIAR program, maintaining the web-based FIAR 
Planning Tool, organizing cross-component financial improvement workshops, 
managing the audit readiness process, and publishing updates to the FIAR Plan 
twice a year.41 Figure 3-1 below shows the organization of the USD(C) office and 
the relation of the FIAR Directorate. 
 
Figure 3-1. USD (Comptroller) Organization 
Source: USD(C) Website: www.dod.mil/comptroller/chartindex.html 
 
 The FIAR directorate is not part of the BTA. Note that it does not report 
through the BTA, but through USD(C). It provides the mechanism by which the 
USD(C) can ensure corrective actions for financial management initiatives are 
aligned with the standards set by the BTA (such as the BEA and SFIS),  
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documented, verified, and tracked. In other words, it is an enabler for the other 
components and agencies as they do the work of completing their requirements. 


















Figure 3-2. FIAR Plan Relationships With BEA and Components 
Source: Generated From BTA Website: www.dod.mil/dbt/tools_fiar.html 
 
 The FIAR Committee sets the priorities for the planning approach. The 
Committee is chaired by the DCFO, and has representation at the executive level 
from the Office of the USD(C), the Military Departments, the Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA), the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), and the 
BTA. The DoD Inspector General acts as an advisor to the Committee. The 
Committee meets once a month, or as needed.42 The FIAR Committee 
established six principles by which to guide the planning process: 
                                            
42 Defense Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan (December 2005) Appendix Q. 
25 
• Institute one DoD financial improvement plan with tiered 
Component plans and accountability; 
• Employ a collaborative management process; 
• Use a prioritized, incremental approach; 
• Integrate transformation programs across the components; 
• Optimize performance through standardized processes, controls, 
and systems; 
• Leverage the lessons learned from component approaches, 
challenges, and successes.43 
Additionally, the Committee is chartered to advise the USD(C) on matters related 
to financial improvement, and ensure improvements are aligned with broader 
context of business transformation.44 
With these principles established, several workshops were organized 
where the services and agencies met to hammer out the specifics of what was to 
become the FIAR Plan. Because many of the participants already had individual 
Financial Improvement Plans (FIPs) from earlier attempts at reforms, this 
knowledge base could be leveraged. Problems, limitations, and weaknesses with 
process and controls were brought to the attention of the group. Cross-
component relationships were identified, and solutions were made to be 
compliant with the BEA. Finally, these groups were able to analyze the situation 
in total, and recommend the setting of high-level milestones for resolving 
deficiencies. These milestones are known as Key Milestone Plans (KMPs) and 
are grouped into Focus Areas.45 KMPs will be discussed further in a following 
section.  
3. FIAR Plan Goals 
 The stated improvement goals of the Plan are written to conform to the 
capabilities stated under the “Financial Visibility” category of the ETP. Initiatives 
that are enacted should improve information accuracy and timeliness in these 
areas. These capabilities are: 
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• Forecast, Plan, Program, and Budget. It is the ability to develop, 
review, evaluate, and support financial forecasts, plans, programs, 
and budgets and integrate them with appropriate performance 
indicators to achieve effective business operations and programs 
goals. 
• Manage Financial Assets and Liabilities. The ability to identify, 
classify, value, and manage fiscal assets, to include accounts 
receivable; and liabilities, to include accounts payable from 
acquisition inception to disposal or liquidation. 
• Funds Allocation, Collection, Disbursement, and Control. The ability 
to control and distribute funds based on appropriation and 
authorization laws, and the ability to monitor such funds against 
available balance. 
• Manage General Ledger. The ability to record propriety and 
budgetary general ledger (USSGL) transactions in accordance with 
accounting standards of the FASAB, GAAP, and other regulatory 
requirements.  
• Managerial Accounting. The ability to accumulate, classify, 
measure, analyze interpret, and report cost and other financial 
information useful to internal and external decision makers. It also 
enables the review of the execution of an organization’s program or 
project resources to ensure they are effectively being used to meet 
objectives 
• Financial Reporting. The ability to provide relevant financial visibility 
and real-time information dashboards for DoD decision makers; the 
ability to summarize financial information for the purposes of 
producing mandatory reports in compliance with regulatory 
requirements; and the ability to develop discretionary reports in 
support of other requirements.46 
Ultimately, the goal of the Plan is to be able to obtain an audit opinion on 
the entire Department. Current projections have that happening around 2017. 
However, the Plan also states that such predictions will change over time. 
Looking at a shorter timeframe, the Department expects to achieve “clean” 
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B.  THE PROCESS 
1.  AUDIT PROCESS 
 Congress, through the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002, 
ordered the DoD to minimize spending money on audits until improvements were 
in place and verified.48 The rationale was to not waste money performing audits 
on line items or organizations that were known to be deficient and would receive 
a disclaimed opinion anyway. Through the FIAR Plan, organizations preparing for 
audits are required to follow a five-step process. The five steps are: 
1. Discovery and Correction. Command management reviews its 
policies, processes, controls, and systems to identify weaknesses 
that impede accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of financial 
information. It then identifies and implements the appropriate 
corrective actions. 
2. Validation. Commands validate that corrective actions successfully 
resolve weaknesses. The scope of the validation is at the discretion 
of the management. 
3. Assertion. Commands assert to the DoD Inspector General the 
reliability of the financial information. This is done through an 
assertion package submitted to the DoD Financial Improvement 
Executive Steering Committee via the command’s component or 
agency. The Committee reviews the package to ensure the 
assertion can pass the scrutiny of an independent audit. Once 
approved, the component makes funding available for the DoD IG 
for the assessment. 
4. Assessment. The DoD IG performs a limited review of controls and 
procedures to determine if the financial information is credible for a 
full financial audit. This may be done by the IG, or contracted to an 
Independent Public Accountant. 
5. Audit. The DoD IG or contracted Independent Public Accountant 
performs a full financial audit.49 
The components and agencies have identified many of the material 
weaknesses that prevent them from receiving a favorable audit through their 
FIPs. As the agencies fully implement corrective actions for line items, they begin  
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the systematic process that will ultimately lead to a full audit of that item. 
Timelines for the line items have been established for each component in each 
Focus Area.  
 The DoD’s Balance Sheet is used to group corrective activities into focus 
areas. For example, Real Property is an asset item on the balance sheet. The 
corrective actions taken by each of the components that affect the real property 
statement item are tracked collectively under the Real Property Focus Area by 
the FIAR Directorate. The plans which establish the milestones to complete 
individual line items are referred to as Key Milestone Plans (KMPs). Figure 3-3 
below is an example from the FIAR Plan of part of a KMP for the Navy under the 
Real Property Focus Area.50 Milestones track the progress of the five-step 
process from discovery through audit. As of June, 2006, the FIAR Plan was 
tracking 954 key milestones.51 
 
 
Figure 3-3.  FIAR Plan KMP Example 
Source: December 2005 FIAR Plan 
 
Because the components were in various stages of progress with their 
respective FIPs prior to the FIAR Plan, the timelines for completion of focus area 
line items vary greatly. For example, the Fund Balance With Treasury focus area,  
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the Air Force should have completed its audit in FY 2008. The Army’s Working 
Capital Fund, Navy, and DLA are not forecasted to be audited in that area until 
FY 2011.52 
2. Material Weaknesses 
 The DoD IG has identified 11 material internal control weaknesses in the 
Department which may adversely affect the accuracy and reliability of financial 
information. These weaknesses were identified following previous audits. The 
FIAR Plan is intended to coordinate and ensure that Components discover the 
causes of these weaknesses within their organizations, and apply corrective 
measures which follow the standardized frameworks established within the ETP. 
The 11 material weaknesses are: 
1. Financial Management Systems: The DoD cannot collect and 
report financial and performance information that is accurate, 
reliable, and timely due to system-wide gaps, and financial systems 
and business processes problems. 
2. Intragovernmental Eliminations: The DoD cannot reconcile 
transactions involving the exchange of goods and services within 
the DoD and with other federal agencies. 
3. Accounting Entries: The DoD continues to enter unsupported 
accounting entries. These are adjustments made to accounting 
records to balance ledgers when they do not add up. 
4. Fund Balance With Treasury: The DoD cannot reconcile its 
records with the U.S. Treasury. 
5. Environmental Liabilities: The DoD lacks the infrastructure to 
identify, estimate, and report environmental liabilities.  
6. General Property, Plant, and Equipment (GPP&E): The cost and 
depreciation of GPP&E is not reliably reported. This is due to 
changes in reporting requirements, a lack of supporting 
documentation for GPP&E purchased several years ago, and the 
use of legacy systems which are not integrated and incapable 
capturing costs or calculating depreciation.  
7. Government Property and Material in the Possession of 
Contractors: The DoD does not have an accurate inventory and 
related costs for property in the possession of contractors. This is 
similar to the GPP&E weakness. 
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8. Inventory: Existing inventory valuation of most activities is not 
reported in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles. 
9. Operating Materials and Supplies: DoD systems are designed to 
expense materials when purchased rather than when consumed. 
10. Statement of Net Cost: The Statement of Net Cost is not 
presented by programs that align with major goals and outputs in 
the DoD’s strategic and performance plan, as required by the 
Government Performance and Results Act. Revenues and 
expenses are reported by appropriation categories due to the 
legacy systems. 
11. Statement of Financing: The DoD cannot reconcile budgetary 
obligations to net cost without making unsupported adjustments.53 
3. Focus Areas 
 In December 2005, the FIAR Plan selected four areas in which to focus 
efforts and correct reported weaknesses. These were Military Equipment, Real 
Property, Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund, and Environmental 
Liabilities. The reasons to focus on these areas first was 1) these areas 
represent a large portion of the DoD’s assets and liabilities 2) corrections could 
have an immediate impact 3) limited resources prevent tackling all areas at once. 
By setting these areas as priorities throughout the Department, the Components 
could align their FIPs to maximize resources and efforts in initiatives that would 
benefit the Department as a whole.  
 The September 2006, version of the FIAR Plan added three more Focus 
Areas to the list. These areas were Inventory and Operating Materials and 
Supplies, Accounts Payable, and Accounts Receivable.54 These additions by the 
FIAR Committee were in keeping with the principle of an incremental approach to 
improvements. 
 In addition to the new Focus Areas, the Committee established four new 
Priority Areas. They were Fund Balance with Treasury, U.S. Marine Corps, 
Military Pay, and Military Obligations. These areas were chosen as priorities 
because they either were projected to achieve accelerated results, or had a high 
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impact on the Balance Sheet or DoD-wide financial improvement efforts.55 What 
the relationship is between Focus Areas and Priority Areas was not mentioned in 
the Plan. 
4. Audit Strategy 
 An unqualified or “clean” opinion on the DoD’s consolidated financial 
statements should provide validation that the underlying financial infrastructure is 
providing accurate, reliable, and timely information to users and decision makers. 
The Department is several years away from being able to pass that test. The 
FIAR Plan sets the process and timelines in a systematic approach to achieve an 
unqualified opinion by 2017. 
 There are three stated objectives of the DoD audit strategy. They are: 
• Sustainable financial improvement for an ascending unqualified 
audit opinion of DoD consolidated financial statements; 
• Sufficient audit readiness for receiving an unqualified audit opinion 
for each of the Military Departments and select Defense Agencies; 
• Assurance that the financial recording and reporting by Defense 
Field Activities that are not required to prepare auditable financial 
statements are not constrained by any material weakness that 
would impair the timely, fair, and accurate presentation on financial 
statements.56 
DoD agencies are divided into 4 Tiers which represent the level of 
requirements of an agency to produce financial statements and conduct audits. 
• Tier 1: Includes those DoD Components that are required to 
undertake an annual audit engagement. They Include: 
• Army General Fund and Working Capital Fund; 
• Navy General Fund and Working Capital Fund; 
• Air Force General Fund and Working Capital Fund; 
• Military Retirement Fund; 
• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; 
• Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund.57 
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• Tier 2: Includes the Defense Intelligences Agencies that are 
required to produce financial statements and are subject to annual 
audit. 
• Tier 3: Includes those agencies that are required by the DoD to 
produce full financial statements and are subject to annual 
independent audits. They include: 
• Chemical Biological Research Program; 
• Defense Advance Research Projects Agency; 
• Defense Commissary Agency; 
• Defense Contract Audit Agency; 
• Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
• Defense Information Systems Agency 
• Defense Logistics Agency 
• Defense Security Service 
• Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
• Missile Defense Agency 
• Special Operations Command 
• Service Medical Activity 
• TRICARE Medical Activity 
• U. S. Marine Corps 
• Tier 4: Includes those Defense Field Activities that are not required 
to prepare stand-alone financial statements. Their financial 
information is included in the DoD consolidate financial 
statements.58  
 These Tiers comprise the audit environment that the FIAR Plan must 
manage. It is using an incremental approach by emphasizing specific line items 
first. Emphasis will, as Components and Agencies become prepared, shift to 
stand-alone financial statements for the organizations, and then eventually to the 
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 associated with planning the auditing timeline are numerous and complicated. 
Details of the next transition from a line item focus to a statement focus require 
further coordination with the Components and the DoD IG.59 
5. FIAR Planning Tool 
 The FIAR Planning Tool (FIAR-PT) is a web-based resource to manage 
many of the FIAR Plan initiatives. It is used as a centralized source for FIAR-
related documents, as well as Business Transformation documents and 
Component Financial Improvement Plans. This tool aids in cross communication 
with managers, leaders, and other stakeholders. KMPs are updated and tracked 
using the FIAR-PT. Information is available cross-component, allowing 
components the opportunity to view plans and lessons learned from other 
teams.60  
C.  PROGRESS 
 Some measurable progress was achieved prior to the release of the FIAR 
Plan Dec 2005. Five of the DoD Components had achieved unqualified opinions 
on audits. They were: 
• Defense Commissary Agency 
• Defense Contract Audit Agency 
• Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
• Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
• Military Retirement Fund 
The Military Retirement Fund alone represents 48% of the Department’s 
liabilities. One other agency, the Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund 
received a qualified opinion on its audit.61 
 The FIAR Plan includes 5-Year projections estimating when focus areas 
will receive unqualified or “clean” opinions on audits. In the Dec 2005 Plan, it was 
predicted that clean opinions could be made on 42% of assets and 48% of 
liabilities in FY2006. Further, by FY2010 71% of assets and 80% liabilities could 
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be verified as clean.62 With the release of the Sep 2006 Plan, the FY2006 
prediction was changed to 18% of assets and 48% of liabilities would be clean. 
The FY2011 forecast shows 72% of assets and 79% of liabilities receiving clean 
opinions.63 No reason was provided for the changes in the forecasts. These 
changes are represented in Figures 3-4 and 3-5 below. 
 





























Figure 3-4. FIAR Projections for Assets 
Source: Generated from December 2005 and September 2006 FIAR Plans 
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Figure 3-5. Projections for Liabilities 
Source: Generated from December 2005 and September 2006 FIAR Plans 
 
 Components are being tracked on the timely completion of KMP line 
items. In FY2006, the Components completed approximately 81% of milestones. 
The significance of uncompleted milestones was not published.64 
 Other significant accomplishments were achieved between January and 
September 2006. Some of these major items are: 
• Army Corps of Engineers: FY2006 financials statements were 
being audited. 
• Air Force: 
• Ready for audit of Fund Balance With Treasury 
• Ready for audit of Cash and Other Monetary Assets 
• Defense Logistics Agency: Ready for audit of Contingent Legal 
Liabilities. 
• Office Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics) (OUSD(AT&L)): Issued revised policy standardizing core 
real property inventory data to improve financial reporting. 
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• Expanded the FIAR Planning Tool to include project plans for 108 
Enterprise and Component transformation initiatives and system 
solutions under the BTA. 
• Revised the capitalization threshold for Real Property to capture 
99% of the expenditures for real property. 
• Revised reporting regulations to more accurately report values on 
the Balance Sheet.65 
D.  CONCLUSION 
 Bringing together all of the efforts geared for financial management reform 
is an enormous and complicated undertaking. The FIAR Plan is the DoD’s 
program to do just that. The Plan is dependent on the work the individual 
components have done previously with their respective FIPs. The FIPs have now 
become the execution arms of the FIAR Plan. By leveraging the work previously 
completed by the components, the Plan was able to generate and track some 
measurable accomplishments over the first nine months of its existence. A 
detailed analysis of the individual component plans was beyond the scope of this 
study. 
 The creation of the FIAR Plan appears to be in keeping with the Friedman 
Report’s vision of the Management Initiative Office. Through the FIAR Plan and 
the FIAR Directorate, the USD(C) is working closely with the components to 
focus efforts to gain immediate successes, promote programs that support long-
term goals, and ensure accountability through periodic reporting.  
 These initial successes will help to establish the FIAR Plan as a viable 
strategy. However, those successes will have to be translated into sustained 
value creation in order to ensure the required changes happen and intended 
benefits are realized. That is the subject of the following chapters. 
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IV.  FIAR PLAN VALUE CREATION 
 The following chapter seeks to address the first major question; does the 
FIAR Plan create value, in the sense that it helps to meet desires and 
expectations of stakeholders concerned? This is accomplished through 
application of the FIAR Plan to a framework, and then examining the value 
elements of the stakeholders from the resulting points of view. 
A.  VALUE 
 The word ‘value’ is defined as “the quality (positive or negative) that 
renders something desirable or valuable.”66 It is an ideal that is accepted by 
some individual or group. Value is by definition very subjective. It is a conceptual 
measure which has different meanings to various groups or individuals. Thus, 
value can be a very difficult concept grasp and quantify, and even more difficult 
to achieve. But, it is important for a discussion on whether a program is worth the 
investment. Value, in a holistic sense, accounts for benefits and costs, whether 
they are tangible or not. 
 With regards to the private sector, value can be relatively easy to 
measure. Those activities which increase the bottom line (profits), increase 
company growth, and improve investor (shareholder) confidence would be 
considered valuable. It is relatively easy to attach a tangible measure to value, a 
dollar figure, for a private enterprise. Performance and progress are easier to 
track with these tangible measures. Accountability is also easy to assign. The 
stakeholders in a private company are fairly limited. They consist of customers, 
suppliers, employees, creditors, shareholders and a select number of special 
interest groups. Because of this limited number, it is easier for stakeholders to 
come into a general agreement as to what can be considered valuable for the 
enterprise. 
 The same cannot be said for a public organization. The issue of what is 
valuable becomes more blurred. Generally, public organizations do not produce 
products and services that are sold. A market system does not exist to determine                                             
66 www.dictionary.com. Accessed on 15 September 2006.  
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the worth of those services. Therefore, it is much harder to assign tangible 
measures to value creating activities. The number of stakeholders is much 
broader than that of a private organization. With regard to federal agencies, 
every citizen has a stake in the organization. It is much harder to generate a 
consensus of what constitutes value. The subjectivity of value complicates the 
task of creating the right value for stakeholders. Furthermore, the monetary 
measures used in private industry do not necessarily translate directly to the 
public side. However, it is still the job of managers in the public sector to use the 
resources entrusted to them to create value for the citizens they serve.67  
B.  THE MOORE MODEL FOR PUBLIC VALUE 
 Given that there are distinct differences between the private and public 
sectors, the framework used to evaluate the FIAR Plan should be one geared for 
public organizations. Models for the private sector which focus on quantitative 
measures of value are too narrow in scope for application to the DoD. In 1995, 
Mark H. Moore, a Harvard Business School professor, wrote Creating Public 
Value: Strategic Management in Government. This work, as the title implies, is 
written specifically for managers in the public sector and analyzes how managers 
can use strategic planning to increase the value of their organizations to their 
stakeholders. 
 The Moore Model recognizes that there are various stakeholders which 
exert different forces upon public organizations for different reasons. He 
simplifies the model by categorizing stakeholders into three distinct directions; 
up, down, and out. Visualizing the manager in the center, he must provide value 
upward as defined by the political system which provides the mandates and 
resources to perform functions. He must provide value downward into the 
organization by effectively managing its operations. He must provide value 
outward by providing results which the public defines as valuable.68 This 
relationship is depicted in Figure 4-1 below. 
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Public Manager








Figure 4-1. Basic Model of Public Organization Stakeholders 
Source: Generated from Moore (1995) 
 
 Moore notes that the traditional role of public managers has been viewed 
as simply carrying out the functions as directed by the political system; no more, 
no less. Public managers are administrators, not innovators.69 Their goal is to 
“achieve the legislatively mandated goals and objectives of their organizations as 
efficiently and effectively as they can.”70 Their orientation is downward into their 
organization to carry out these delineated functions, often with dictated 
constraints. Any public value created is the by-product of carrying out the 
directed mission. The interactions between the various stakeholders are one-way 
(Figure 4-2 below). What is missing from the traditional view is the focus on the 
achievement of valuable results by orienting outward, and the renegotiating of 
policy mandates by orienting upward.71  
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Figure 4-2. Moore Model Traditional Interactions 
Source: Generated from Moore (1995) 
 
 Moore discusses how managers in the public sector can (or should) go 
beyond political mandates and the traditional role as an administrator, and 
actively seek to create value in their organization. It is an adaptation of a private 
sector mentality to a public sector environment. It is not a direct translation. To do 
this, public managers must actively engage all of the forces acting upon their 
enterprise. Moore states, “…in envisioning public value, managers must find a 
way to integrate politics, substance, and administration.”72 To go beyond the 
mandate and create value requires administrators to become strategists and 
actively seek goals and methods to improve the value of their organization. By 
focusing on the traditional functions and measures of current operations, public 
managers can miss the opportunity to evaluate the potential benefits of doing 
things differently. 
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Figure 4-3. Moore Model Ideal Interactions 
Source: Generated from Moore (1995) 
 
 A word of caution here; going beyond the mandate does not mean 
performing functions without the approval or authorization of the political system. 
A democratic system of government demands that public officers be held 
accountable to the general public. The public’s will is reinforced through the 
election of executive and legislative bodies. These bodies add legitimacy to 
authorized programs and provide resources for their execution. However, 
managers in the public sector are (ideally) hired as experts in their field. They 
should have special insight into the issues, problems, solutions, and 
management for which their organization was created. This type of expert power 
should be used to interact with and influence the political system to provide 
mandates and resources to help managers increase the value created by their 
organizations. Thus, the one-way interactions of the traditional system are 
replaced by two-way involvement with the various stakeholders, as seen in 
Figure 4-3 above. 
A corporate strategy for a public organization should be developed which 
performs the following three functions: 
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• Declares the overall mission or purpose of the organization; 
• Offers an account of the sources of support and legitimacy that will 
be tapped to sustain society’s commitment to the enterprise; 
• Explains how the enterprise will have to be organized and operated 
to achieve the declared objectives.73 
These elements must be brought into alignment by meeting three broad tests. 
• Is the enterprise substantially valuable in the sense that the 
organization produces things of value to overseers, clients, and 
beneficiaries at low cost in terms of money and authority? 
• Is the enterprise legitimate and politically sustainable? 
• Is the enterprise operationally and administratively feasible?74 
If an organization, or its strategy, cannot pass all three tests, then it will likely fail 
to deliver on its potential value and eventually lose support.  
C.  APPLICATION OF THE MOORE MODEL 
 The FIAR Plan is the DoD strategy to improve its financial systems and 
reporting. As discussed earlier, the FIAR Directorate is an organization inside the 
DoD Comptroller’s office. The Directorate is more of an enabler for other DoD 
organizations rather than an actual producer of services. Thus, it is helpful to 
include in the center of the model those entities that are responsible for making 
the goals of the FIAR Plan a reality. This includes the BTA, USD(C), and the DoD 
component financial management offices. Collectively this group will be referred 
to as DoD FM. See Figure 4-4 below. 
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Figure 4-4. Application of Moore Model to DoD FM 
Source: Generated from Moore (1995) 
 
 As the model is applied, the picture becomes more complex as 
stakeholders are broken out. In looking up, Congress is definitely foremost on the 
political side. They provide the political mandates and resources for DoD.  
The GAO is placed in the political direction because of its influence on the 
political bodies that maintain the power. The GAO is technically part of Congress. 
But, it acts very much like an independent agency, issuing opinions not just to 
Congress, but also to the media and public. As the watchdog of Congress 
regarding federal agency performance, GAO reports have high visibility. Findings 
and recommendations by the GAO can have a noticeable impact on legislation, 
regulations, and policy decisions. The GAO has been delegated the responsibility 
to monitor compliance for applicable laws and perform the audits on the 
government-wide financial statements. 
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OMB is also considered in the political side. Laws from Congress are 
translated into regulations and guidance issued from OMB through devices like 
the OMB Circulars. It is also responsible for reporting on compliance and 
performance of the federal agencies directly to the President.  
The DoD components are placed in the out direction because they are, or 
should be, receivers of the services or benefits derived from the DoD financial 
management community. Improved financial infrastructure should help the 
components conduct their tasks. Those benefits are not necessarily the same as 
those perceived by the general public, which is also placed in the out direction. 
The general public is the owner of the Department and pays for its operations 
through taxes. This illustrates the difference between direct clients and 
beneficiaries of services, and the owners of the organization. This is a 
fundamental point of Moore’s view of a public organization.75 This will be 
expounded on later. 
The financial management organizations of the various agencies are in 
the downward direction. These are the organizations to which DoD FM must 
administer. While the FIAR Directorate does not have direct control over these 
organizations, it is responsible for the coordination of their efforts, tracking 
progress, and reporting results. Senior managers in the component 
organizations, that are responsible for their respective FIPs, should be 
considered part of the strategic center and provide the direct connection between 
the DoD FM and the component financial management communities. 
It is at this point the Moore Model becomes somewhat incomplete. It does 
not include the interactions between the stakeholders that do not go through the 
manager. These bonds would include communication links such as the media 
and informal networks. But, they are outside the direct control of the managers in 
the center. For instance, there is a very strong relationship between Congress 
and the public. The GAO is also very vocal with the media and public with regard 
to financial management in the DoD. Additionally, there are formal and informal 
networks in existence between the component FM organizations and the                                             
75 Mark H. Moore, Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government. Replica 
Books, Bridgewater, N.J. (1995) 53. 
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components themselves. To complete the picture of the forces at play these 
loops need to be closed.  See Figure 4-5 below. It is important to understand 
these external relationships as they can be a vulnerability to success of the plan, 
or an opportunity to be exploited. For the purposes of presenting a more 















Figure 4-5. Complete DoD FM Model Showing Exterior Links 
Source: Author 
 
D. EXAMINING VALUE FOR STAKEHOLDERS 
 The above model lays the framework for dividing the stakeholders into 
focus areas. A closer examination of several of the stakeholders the DoD 
Financial Management community must come to terms with the following:  
1.  Up – Political  
 The integration of politics into strategic plans is essential for any public 




exposure the Pentagon has with the highest levels of each of the federal 
government branches. It is also important because of the enormous amount of 
resources required for it to perform its functions.  
 Congress is comprised of 535 individuals who will each have varying 
perceptions on what they think the role of the DoD is, and how it should conduct 
its business. But, at some point these individuals reach a consensus and express 
their opinions through passage of law. Thus, legislation passed by Congress, 
reviewed in Chapter II, stands as the stated desires of the body with regard to the 
financial management requirements of federal agencies. To summarize some of 
the Congressional goals mentioned earlier, these requirements are: 
• Production of auditable financial statements which reflect the 
financial position and results of operations from the agency; 
• Improved compliance with accounting and reporting standards; 
• Disclosure of the full cost of operations; 
• Increase the capability to compare the spending of resources with 
the results of activities; 
• Financial information produced should be complete, timely, reliable, 
and consistent. It should be used by the executive and legislative 
branches to improve decision making. 
These are the political mandates that the Department must comply with. This is 
what Congress as a body has stated it desires.  
 One of the main points Moore makes about evaluating the value created 
within an organization is that value is rooted in the desires and perceptions of 
individuals. It is vital that managers understand what stakeholders think is 
valuable.76 Furthermore, value is created through two different activities. The first 
is the deployment of money and authority to provide services that produce value 
for specific clients and beneficiaries. The second way is by operating the 
institution in a manner which satisfies the desires of the citizens and political 
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system through performance measures and accountability.77 It is this second 
way which is important to focus on with regard to creating value for Congress. 
 By integrating the efforts of the various DoD agencies, and setting 
priorities at the Department level, the FIAR Plan sets in motion a strategy to 
achieve those political mandates which have been directed. It shows, at the very 
least, a commitment to move the institution in a direction to achieve compliance. 
The FIAR Plan, by enabling a systematic and accountable process that the DoD 
agencies, and the DoD as a whole, can follow to produce repeatable, auditable 
financial statements, will eventually satisfy the legal requirements for Congress. 
Additionally, the FIAR Plan can be used by the DoD as evidence that it is making 
an honest attempt to use the Department’s resources more efficiently and 
effectively. 
Another point that Moore brings up regarding value creation is that the 
operational environment will change, and public organizations must adapt to 
those changes.78 One element to creating value is anticipating future benefits to 
authorizers, customers, and owners. As the FIAR Plan makes progress, the DoD 
will have at its disposal better and more accurate proprietary accounting 
information. This is in contrast to the budget accounting information used today. 
A future of solid proprietary accounting systems will open up the possibility of 
new thinking and new incentives. It does not have to be “business as usual.” How 
the changes can or should change the information flow between the DoD and 
political leadership is not addressed in the FIAR Plan. But, there is an opportunity 
for the BTA and/or USD(C) to be leading the effort to ensure the maximum value 
is generated from the political side. 
 The GAO, in its role as the evaluator of federal programs, is looking to 
ensure the DoD, and other federal agencies are in compliance with the 
Congressional mandates and are performing in an effective and efficient manner. 
Thus, desires of the GAO are similar to those of Congress. One major goal of the 
Comptroller General is to be able to audit the federal government’s financial 
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statements and render an opinion on its financial position.79 Because of the 
problems with DoD, he will be unable to do so until the DoD can fix its problems 
and produce auditable statements. The GAO has issued numerous reports that 
repeat weaknesses in financial systems and management.80 It is looking to see 
progress in addressing the problems they have reported. The FIAR Plan provides 
a mechanism to report that progress and refocus the efforts of components if 
necessary. 
 OMB, as the issuer of regulations, is also looking for compliance from the 
DoD. As the organization that reports directly to the President, they too want to 
ensure the organization is performing effectively.  
The simple fact that there is now a more comprehensive plan for financial 
management reform has produced some benefits. Both the GAO81 and the DoD 
IG82 have made positive statements with regard to the FIAR Plan as being a step 
in the right direction. OMB recognized the potential of the Plan by raising DoD’s 
PMA Scorecard in ‘Progress in Financial Management’ from “Yellow” to “Green” 
between September and December 2005.83 While these acknowledgements may 
seem minor, they do indicate approval from the major players in the political 
arena. Provided that measurable progress can be continued and documented, 
support in the form of resources, political legitimacy, and negotiating power could 
increase with time. 
 Time is also an element the political side values. No one in the political 
arena wishes the FIAR Plan to be an open-ended program. Congress has been 
waiting 16 years for full compliance with the CFO Act and its amendments. 
According to the latest projection, they are going to have to wait another 11 years 
                                            
79 David Walker, Government Accountability Office Statement on the U.S. Government’s 
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49 
until 2017.84 It has been stated that the FIAR Plan is a results driven plan, and 
not timeline driven. Yet, timelines are used extensively in the written documents. 
This has led to some confusion on Capitol Hill.85 By listing timelines then not 
meeting deadlines or moving deadlines to the right without explanation creates 
the impression that either the plan or the execution is flawed.  
One case in point is going back to the 5-years projections for clean 
opinions on assets mentioned in Chapter III. See Figure 4-6 below. In the 
December 2005 release, 42% of the DoD’s assets were projected to have a 
“clean” opinion in 2006.86 This was based on the Military Equipment line item 
achieving the opinion. The September 2006 release shows an updated projection 
of 15% of assets having the “clean” opinion in 2006. No change from 2005. The 
Military Equipment line item now shows a 2009 date for audit.87 There may be a 
very good reason why that item needed to be moved to the right. However, no 
explanation was given for the delay. This was one of many examples of changes 
between the two releases. These changes, and some are quite dramatic (such 
as Defense Logistic Agency’s date for audit in the Other Liabilities category 
shifting three years)88, can lead political leadership to question the validity or 
sincerity of the plan. Value that was achieved could quickly be lost. 
                                            
84 Defense Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan (September, 2006) 39. 
85 Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Federal Financial Management, 
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Figure 4-6. FIAR Projections for Assets 
Source: Generated from December 2005 and September 2006 FIAR Plans 
 
2. Out – Substance 
 Looking out requires examining the two activities that a public organization 
is responsible for; running an institution that is in keeping with the expectations of 
the owners, and providing goods and services directly to clients and 
beneficiaries. For the purposes of this analysis, the principle stakeholder 
analyzed with the former is the general public. The direct clients and 
beneficiaries of DoD financial management are the Department’s individual 
services and agencies. It would be a valid argument to claim that there are many 
other clients and beneficiaries outside of the Department, such as contractors, 
other government agencies, foreign governments, etc. However, these other 
stakeholders were not considered for purposes of simplification. 
 If the premise is accepted that the effective running of a public institution is 
a reasonable requirement, then it follows that the administration of the 
organization is equally as important as the operations. The ability to be able to 
justify the actions and processes of the organization is just as critical as the 





























actual services it provides is another point Moore makes.89 For the DoD, every 
tax paying American citizen is an “owner” in the organization. The perceived 
benefits of DoD operations can vary greatly between these individuals. For 
example, some communities in which military bases are located benefit directly 
from the application of authority and resources from the Department. Their local 
economy and local government can be heavily supported by Defense spending. 
On the other side, members of some communities throughout the country that 
have no direct dealings with the Department may see no direct influences on 
their daily lives. But, everyone still has a stake in how the organization is run. 
They are paying for it. And therefore, the DoD has an obligation to show that it is 
using the resources provided by the public as a whole effectively and fairly. 
Financial visibility is one window in looking at how the DoD uses those 
resources.  
The FIAR Plan, through the improved financial reporting, is intended to 
provide better visibility in how the DoD is using its resources. Auditable financial 
reports are one element in providing verifiable proof that the DoD is conducting 
business in a manner which the public expects. With the DoD’s inability to 
maintain timely, accurate, reliable and verifiable financial information, confidence 
in the institution’s ability to perform its functions effectively is eroded, and the 
value created through operations can be called into question. 
 To illustrate the difference between performing a function and accounting 
for it, following the devastating Katrina hurricane affected citizens demanded 
immediate assistance. One of the solutions to alleviate hardships was for the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to distribute money through 
checks and debit cards to affected individuals. Over $5 billion in financial aid was 
distributed to victims. Without the proper financial systems in place, proper 
planning, and firm controls, FEMA could not reasonably assure that payments 
were being made to individuals qualified to receive those funds. Billions of dollars 
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in federal assistance may have been paid to fraudulent claimants.90 This was 
one of many FEMA programs that came under fire in the wake of the storm.91 
The inability of FEMA to account for its actions and maintain financial controls led 
to an erosion of trust by the public in the ability of the organization to perform.  
 The preceding example was an extreme case. But, it goes to the point that 
providing a service and accounting for it are two distinct functions. Citizens 
needed the direct benefits of services from FEMA in the form of emergency cash. 
FEMA did just that and distributed funds. By not having the right systems and 
controls in place to account for its actions, the positive actions of the agency 
were countered by the questioning of the process.  
 Do financial statements by themselves create this public confidence? The 
answer is likely, no. The vast majority of the public will never read the DoD 
financial statements, let alone understand them. It is the opinion that creates the 
value. It is the independent evaluation from a trusted agent that verifies that the 
DoD is operating as it should that is important. That is the necessity of gaining an 
unqualified opinion on the financial statement.  
 But, the value creation goes a little further than that. While consolidated 
financial statements give validity to the big picture at the Department level, with 
solid financial systems working efficiently across the Department, each agency 
can better justify its individual financial decisions to the public and political 
authorizers.  With the systems and controls in place that are required to attain an 
unqualified opinion, individual managers will be in a better position to prevent 
waste and abuse, and verify that their financial decisions are based on firm data. 
An unqualified opinion adds credibility to the financial decisions made. 
The FIAR Plan creates value for the public in two ways. First, it is an 
enabler for the DoD and its agencies to get their financial systems in order and 
attain independent unqualified opinions. Second, it provides a single plan which 
can be displayed to owners and authorizers that problems are being addressed 
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and progress is being achieved. Such a presentation is easier for an audience to 
comprehend than having DoD officials explain the progress of 10 separate plans. 
Such recognition was noted above from the GAO and DoD IG. 
 Focusing outward also requires looking at the desires and expectations of 
clients and beneficiaries. With regard to the DoD’s financial management 
community, these clients are the major DoD components. The desires of the 
components are probably quite different from the stakeholders examined above. 
For them it is the fighting of the nation’s wars and carrying out the policies of the 
President that is the primary focus. While mission accomplishment may be focus 
of uniformed leadership, finances permeate every aspect of the DoD’s 
operations, support, and administration. The service DoD FM provides is 
supporting the services operational tasking and training. 
 Leaders of the service components are faced with tough financial 
decisions. With the increases in entitlement spending in the coming years, 
pressure on the top-line will continue to grow.92 Budgets are becoming tighter, 
operations are becoming more expensive, and equipment is getting older and is 
in need of replacement. Leadership is continuously facing the choice of 
modernizing the financial systems or buying much needed equipment for 
operational forces. The short term answer may be to put off system 
modernization until later. That, however, may have long-term consequences.  
 As it stands now, none of the services have financial information systems 
which can provide timely, reliable, and accurate information on a consistent 
basis. These systems provide the data that all levels of management use to 
make decisions, up to and including the President and Congress. This leaves 
open the door for decisions and performance to be questioned. Uniformed 
leaders do have a stake in financial improvement. And, they should be 
concerned that the information they currently have cannot be confirmed to be 
timely, reliable, or accurate.  
 There are many business transformation efforts underway throughout the 
services. These involve not just finances, but also include logistics, supply, and                                             
92 Congressional Budget Office. The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update. 
(Washington, D.C.: August 2006) 20. 
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management. The main purpose of all of these enterprise transformation efforts 
is to improve business processes and make the organizations more efficient so 
resources can be used for other objectives like recapitalization. But, the 
underlying foundation for any process improvement that involves cost as a metric 
is financial. The current budget accounting used by DoD does not fully support 
the information requirements to perform the types of analysis that would generate 
the maximum benefit. 
 A specific case involves the Navy’s program for business transformation 
within the naval aviation community, the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE). The 
NAE seeks to transform the business processes within the naval aviation 
community to improve readiness and responsiveness. The stated goals of the 
NAE are: 
• Balance current and future readiness; 
• Reduce costs and improve “product per dollar” to naval aviation; 
• Enhance organizational agility; 
• Maintain and improve alignment with the CNO; 
• Implement Fleet driven metrics; 
• Attain and maintain visibility across the enterprise.93 
The main purpose of reducing costs is so that savings can be redirected into 
recapitalization.94 Much of what NAE leadership needs is financial in nature. 
Interviews indicate that NAE leadership is aware of the financial systems 
shortfalls, but upgrades are not currently the major priority. In order to reduce 
costs, they must first be understood and known. Budget accounting systems do 
not support the kind of data required to make the optimal decisions necessary to 
satisfy the objectives.  
The Navy ERP should provide a financial reporting foundation with the 
timely and relevant information to build the managerial accounting system(s) the 
NAE could apply for cost reductions and process improvements. The NAE is the 
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most mature of several enterprises within the Navy. It would be to the uniformed 
leadership’s advantage to encourage and incorporate these financial 
improvements so they will have better financial information on which to formulate 
their decisions. 
In the DoD adaptation to new purposes and requirements is very difficult 
to recognize, resource, and manage. The pace of the changing environment is 
also getting quicker with technological advancements, the rise of a new world 
order following the end of the Cold War, and the evolution of the 24-hour news 
cycle, all of which further complicate matters. With regard to financial 
management, the solution in the past was to create unit-specific financial 
systems and processes. While it looked like an efficient way to get things done at 
the lowest level, the end result has been the creation of a multitude of systems 
that actually stifles the ability of the DoD to adapt and change at all levels. The 
creation of business standards like the BEA and SFIS implemented by the FIAR 
Plan, as discussed in Chapter III, should help to lay a foundation for changes to 
be incorporated in a manner that suits the needs of users at all levels and in all 
services. 
As was mentioned before, the integration of proprietary accounting 
systems into the DoD should open up the possibilities of doing business 
differently than before. Solid financial data provide the foundation for managerial 
or cost accounting systems. These can greatly aid in finding and reducing non-
value added activities, and improve controls so there is waste. The benefit for the 
service components are better use of scarce resources, a increased ability to 
recapitalize, and a better standing with the public and political authorizers. 
Continued progress with the FIAR Plan should help make that a reality sooner. 
A concept that non-financial managers may not fully grasp is that the 
financial reporting problems in the Department are not wholly accounting 
problems. The financial management community tracks financial information. 
They do not generate it. As one financial manager put it, “We count the beans, 
we don’t make them.” This is another common theme from discussions with all of 
the senior financial managers interviewed. The non-financial elements of the 
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Department, who actually generate the transactions and feed the information into 
the financial systems, are part of the problem. This includes those involved with 
logistics, supply, human resources, contracting and acquisitions. They have to be 
part of the solution. This element is not explicitly stated in the FAIR Plan. But, the 
service FIP managers do recognize this and are working to address this issue 
themselves. All stated that progress has been made on improving awareness 
among the uniformed leaders, but that there is much to be done. 
One thing that is understated in the FIAR Plan is the need for relevant 
financial information. The relevancy of information is mentioned only once in the 
September 2006 FIAR Plan. The emphasis is on timeliness, reliability, and 
accuracy which are important terms for auditability. But, the customers of DoD 
FM need relevant information. The financial managers interviewed stated they 
are addressing relevancy through their FIPs. But, it should probably be more 
prominent in the FIAR Plan itself. 
3. Down – Administration 
 In order to create the value for others, someone or something has to do 
the work. Top level managers and leaders have to give their people the tools and 
incentives to make things happen. The financial management community in the 
Department has an enormous task with improvement efforts. While improvement 
efforts are underway, they still have to support their commands with current 
operations.  
 The FIAR Plan supports the FIPs of the DoD agencies. The Air Force FIP 
is called the Air Force Information Reliability and Integration (AFIR&I) Action 
Plan. Their supporting integrated financial system being developed is called the 
Defense Enterprise Accounting Management System (DEAMS). The Army’s FIP 
is called the Future Business System (FBS) and its integrated financial system is 
called the General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS). The Navy’s FIP 
is incorporated into one comprehensive program called the Navy Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) program.95  
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 What the FIAR Plan provides to DoD financial managers is a common 
framework for long range planning of requirements. It also provides standard 
processes for all of the agencies to prepare for their audits once the system 
objectives are complete. It combines the systems transformation with audit 
preparedness. But, it also allows the different agencies to configure their systems 
to meet their unique requirements. This positive aspect of the FIAR Plan was a 
common theme discussed among the senior financial managers. 
 One of the principles of the FIAR Plan is to integrate the transformation 
programs across the components. A comment that was common to most of the 
financial managers was that while the FIAR Plan required some interaction 
among the services, there is room for improvement. The services appear to be 
working on their respective KMPs according to the Plan, but they are not working 
together. There is an advantage to that which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. But, FIAR Plan managers should look for additional opportunities to 
leverage the experience between the components. Done with some strategic 
forethought, better interaction might help to reduce the time and costs of fixing 
systems, using the information more effectively, and getting the assertion for 
audit quicker. 
 When asked if their financial managers were prepared to handle and use 
effectively the information available from a proprietary accounting system, most 
of the senior financial mangers responded that their people were currently not 
proficient with that type of information. The FIAR Plan is a systems and process 
geared plan. But, as these new systems come on line, people have to be made 
capable of being able to configure the systems to make them worthwhile. 
Otherwise, the true value that would be created from these efforts will not be 
realized. As was stated in the Friedman Report, “…it is possible to reach the goal 
of reliable financial information and a clean opinion and still not have information 
that is relevant to managers.”96 As the DoD becomes CFO Act compliant and 
achieves an unqualified opinion, relevancy may be compromised. That means 
transforming people is just as important as transforming systems.                                              
96 DoD Report, “Transforming Department of Defense Financial Management: A Strategy for 
Change” (13 April 2001) iii. 
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 Changing DoD financial managers from a budgetary accounting mindset 
to a proprietary accounting mindset is important for several reasons. Some of 
which will be covered in the next chapter. But, it will be critical for users of these 
new systems to understand how they work in order to obtain and sustain 
unqualified opinions. Additionally, the value benefits mentioned above will not be 
realized if people do not understand what information they need or what 
information they are looking at. The FIAR Plan is not explicit about a 
people/training/education strategy. That was not one of the material weaknesses 
listed by the DoD IG. However, the USD(C) and the other agencies should be 
looking ahead to prepare their people to operate in what will be a new world for 
them. 
E. CONCLUSION 
 The Moore Model of a public organization focuses on stakeholder 
interests and examining what they perceive as value added activities. Value is 
created through the integration of politics, substance, and administration. Bear in 
mind that value creation does not necessarily involve just meeting stated desires. 
It also involves using expert knowledge to influence those desires.97 Public 
managers need to also be good marketers. 
 In summing up value elements created through the FIAR Plan, these are 
the items inherent in the Plan. 
• Provides a roadmap for compliance with Congressional mandates 
and OMB regulations; 
• Provides a comprehensive framework for component FIP managers 
to follow; 
• Enforces standards to ensure consistency across the Department; 
• Demonstrates progress to overseers and the public; 
• Improves systems to provide better information for decision making. 
Additional value that is either not inherent in the Plan or could be a future focus 
includes: 
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• Working with political leadership to take advantage of future 
financial visibility. Regulations and incentives need to be addressed 
with political leadership to encourage innovation.98 Active 
engagement of the political system is also a tenet of Moore.99  
• Improved visibility to changes in the Plan so overseers have less 
reason to question the sincerity or execution of the Plan. The 
Friedman Report pointed out that the DoD has developed a 
credibility problem with all of its stakeholders with regard to 
financial management.100 Full visibility is step toward building back 
credibility. 
• Seeking progress metrics that non-financial managers can 
understand and appreciate. If support from outside the financial 
management community is desired, then an effort to include 
accomplishments outsiders will understand will help. 
• Make the relevance of financial information just as important as the 
timeliness, accuracy, and reliability of it.  
• Including the transformation of financial managers as people to 
handle the transformation of systems and processes. Solid financial 
systems will provide data. But, people have to be capable of using 
that data in order to make it valuable.  
This is not an all inclusive list, rather, a foundation for further examination and 
discussion. 
Finally, an examination of Moore’s three tests is warranted to complete the 
assessment and get a sense if the FIAR Plan is a viable strategy.  
• Is the enterprise substantially valuable in the sense that the 
organization produces things of value to overseers, clients, and 
beneficiaries at low cost in terms of money and authority? Yes. As 
the preceding evidence indicates, the FIAR Plan does produce 
value for the DoD and its stakeholders. But, that value may not be 
recognized by some beneficiaries. As for its cost, it is currently 
within the bounds of acceptability as the Plan and the FIPs it 
supports are currently funded. That is a risk factor which will be 
examined in the following chapter. 
 
 
                                            
98 DoD Report, “Transforming Department of Defense Financial Management: A Strategy for 
Change” (13 April 2001) iii. 
99 Mark H. Moore, Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government. Replica 
Books, Bridgewater, N.J. (1995) 75. 
100 DoD Report, “Transforming Department of Defense Financial Management: A Strategy 
for Change” (13 April 2001) ii. 
60 
• Is the enterprise legitimate and politically sustainable? Yes. The 
FIAR Plan currently has the support of Congress, the GAO, the 
DoD IG, and OMB. It should be noted that political sustainability 
does not guarantee the plan can executed over the long-term. That 
is the subject of the next chapter. 
• Is the enterprise operationally and administratively feasible? Yes. 
Producing auditable financial statements and obtaining an 
unqualified opinion is not an impossible task. Several federal 
agencies and thousands of private companies have already done it. 
It is a matter of time, resources, and commitment. 
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V.  FIAR PLAN SUSTAINABILITY 
 The following chapter seeks to address the second major question; can 
the changes required of the FIAR Plan be sustained over the long-term? This is 
accomplished through application of the FIAR Plan to a framework designed for 
examining changes processes. From this, a risk assessment can be made 
concerning the risks associated with the FIAR Plan’s long-term sustainability.  
A.  RATIONALE FOR EXAMINING SUSTAINABILITY 
 The previous chapter shows the FIAR Plan has the potential to create 
value for the various stakeholders. However, if it is a plan which cannot be 
executed and sustained over the long term, then its value comes into question. 
Considering the amount of resources and time put into the program, it could be 
argued that its failure would drain value from the organization. It is not enough to 
have noble goals and plans. At some point the value in a plan has to be realized 
through the achievement of intermediate goals and an effort that is sustained 
through completion.  
 Moore states that sustainability is critical for any strategy to succeed.101 
Thus, this is an issue which deserves further examination. The Moore Model 
does not comprehensively address sustainability. The FIAR Plan is a change 
process. Its concentration is on changing systems and processes. But, those 
changes require support from stakeholders. Numerous works of academic 
research have been conducted on organizational change, which include both 
private and public sector studies. However, the findings lack full adaptation to the 
DoD and the unique environment it operates in. One recent study provides a 
good basis for evaluating the sustainability of the FIAR Plan.  
B.  THE FERNANDEZ/RAINEY MODEL 
 Sergio Fernandez of Indiana University and Hal Rainey of the University of 
Georgia released a study in the summer of 2006 entitled “Managing Successful 
Organizational Change in the Public Sector: An Agenda for Research and 
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Practice.”102 This study was a compilation of many works dealing with change at 
the organizational level. It includes references to studies that dealt with both the 
private and public sectors. However, their conclusions were geared specifically 
for the public side. 
 Fernandez and Rainey included elements from many different academic 
theories on the change process. These were: 
• Rational adaptive theories:103 Propose that change is driven by a 
manager’s purposeful action by analyzing the organizational 
environment and making necessary changes to the structure and 
processes to match that environment.  
• Institutional theories:104 Argue that organizations exist in an 
environment “populated by public and private stakeholders and 
authorities, and the norms, values, rules, and cognitive systems 
they uphold.” It is conformity to those norms that drives change. 
Therefore, for an organization to change, society must change. Or, 
that change must be dictated by legitimate authority. 
• Life cycle theories:105 Suggests that change is natural and 
spontaneous as the organization moves through phases of 
development. Change is inherent within the organization. 
Resistance and acceptance of change are represented as rigidity 
and adaptation cycles, respectively. 
• Ecological and evolutionary theories:106 Similar to life cycle 
theories, ecological and evolutionary theories hold that purposeful 
action is limited in its effectiveness. Organizations will naturally 
adapt to the environment. Those that do not will perish. 
• Policy diffusion and innovation models:107 Holds that public 
managers seek changes that emulate their peers. They do this for 
three reasons: to learn and borrow successful ideas and practices; 
to be competitive; and to satisfy public demand for policies which 
mirror others. 
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• Dialectical and conflict theories of change:108 Organizations 
exist in a pluralistic world with conflicting interests, ideas, and 
values. It is through confrontation and conflict that new ideas and 
value emerge to challenge the status quo, and ultimately replace it. 
From their synthesis of studies conducted using these theory types, 
Fernandez and Rainey developed eight factors to successful change in the public 
sector. These factors are geared specifically toward, “…large-scale, planned, 
strategic, and administrative changes – of the sort now often referred to as 
organizational transformations in large organizations such as general purpose 
government agencies or city and county governments.”109 The FIAR Plan, and 
the DoD organization in which it was designed to influence, fits this condition. 
The change sustainability factors are:   
1. Ensure the need.110 Managerial leaders must verify and 
persuasively communicate the need for change. This 
communication should be a continual process to as many 
stakeholders as possible. Efforts should be made to take 
advantage of mandates, political windows of opportunity, and 
external influences to verify and communicate the need for change.  
2. Provide a plan.111 Managerial leaders must develop a course of 
action or strategy for implementing change. Visions must be 
translated into a pragmatic plan with achievable goals. 
Organizations need direction. This is so, “…the transformation does 
not disintegrate into a set of unrelated and confusing directives and 
activities.”112  
3. Build internal support for change and overcome resistance.113 
Managerial leaders must build internal support for change and 
reduce resistance to it through widespread participation in the 
change process and other means. Internal political structures can 
be a major road block to the change process. Fernandez and 
Rainey warn, “…reform movements in government, in which 
reformers prescribe major organizational changes for government 
agencies, can aggravate the problem of resistance to changes.” 
                                            
108 Sergio Fernandez and Hal Rainey. “Managing Successful Organizational Change in the 
Public Sector: An Agenda for Research and Practice” in Public Administration Review. 
(March/April 2006), 5. 
109 Ibid., 6. 
110 Ibid., 8. 
111 Ibid., 9. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid., 10. 
64 
Furthermore, “reforming may be no more than a governmental 
fashion statement…with highly superficial impact.”114 Fernandez 
and Rainy cite the possible need for portraying a shock or crisis to 
help decrease resistance.  
4. Ensure top management support and commitment.115 Top 
managers should take on the role of change agent or idea 
champion or actively support the person or group that is 
designated. Fernandez and Rainey also note that in the public 
sector, top level support must come from both the political and civil-
service leadership. 
5. Build external support.116 Managerial leaders must develop 
support from political overseers and key external stakeholders. 
Public organizations often have multiple political overseers with 
different affiliations that wish to pursue different agendas. Gaining 
support is a challenge, but necessary to ensure availability of 
resources and prevent roadblocks from legislation or regulation. 
Managing the interest group environment was found to be critical. 
Opposition from such groups can force modifications to plans which 
can increase costs and/or threaten the success of the change 
process. 
6. Provide resources.117 Successful change requires sufficient 
resources to support the process. Changes at the organizational 
level require a commitment of non-trivial resources; both in terms of 
money and manpower. Those efforts that are not fully funded tend 
to fail. 
7. Institutionalize change.118 Managers and employees must 
effectively institutionalize changes. Not only should systems and 
processes be changed, but also behavior. Without institutionalizing 
the changes, employees will revert to old behavior patterns. The 
pace of change can be critical. Studies are mixed on the 
effectiveness of rapid vs. incremental change. Fernandez and 
Rainey note that incremental changes could be risky in a public 
organization due to the frequent turnover of political leadership. 
8. Pursue comprehensive change.119 Managerial leaders must 
develop an integrative, comprehensive approach to change that 
                                            
114 Sergio Fernandez and Hal Rainey. “Managing Successful Organizational Change in the 
Public Sector: An Agenda for Research and Practice” in Public Administration Review. 
(March/April 2006), 10. 
115 Ibid., 12. 
116 Ibid., 14. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid., 15. 
119 Ibid., 16. 
65 
achieves subsystem congruence. Examples of subsystems include 
recruitment, training, incentives, structural, information, and control 
systems. These subsystems are interdependent and must be 
brought into balance when trying to make organizational changes.  
C.  BROOK STUDY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AUDITED FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS 
Fernandez and Rainey point out that their paper was based on academic 
findings of previous studies. They recommend further study on the subject of 
sustained changed in the public sector. But, an independent study published in 
2001 by Douglas Brook entitled “Audited Financial Statements: Getting and 
Sustaining “Clean” Opinions” dealt specifically with the change process with 
regard to financial management and financial statement production in the federal 
government. This study provides a reasonable test of the validity of using the 
Fernandez/Rainey factors on a federal organization like the DoD. 
 Brook’s study examined the correlation between organizational 
characteristics and audit opinions for the financial statements of the 24 CFO Act 
agencies between 1996 and 1999. He identified six characteristics which were 
common in those agencies that were able to successfully achieve clean opinions. 
Those characteristics were: 
• Demonstrated senior leadership commitment; 
• Positive resource allocation; 
• Positive working relationships between financial managers and 
auditors; 
• Positive cooperative arrangements between financial and line and 
functional managers; 
• Short-term “work-around solutions” applied; 
• Application of extraordinary effort to key problem areas.120 
These characteristics are consistent with the factors identified by 
Fernandez and Rainey. It appears that the roles of leadership, adequate 
resources, and internal and external relationship management are critical to 
sustained success.  
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The last two characteristics, work-around solutions and extraordinary 
effort, were cases in which the agencies had problem areas which could be 
solved with short-term efforts. According the Fernandez and Rainey, these short-
term efforts can be used to build internal and external support and break 
resistance.121 Brook noted that some agencies used work-around systems 
designed to produce auditable statements, however they were not designed to 
provide useful information for management decisions.122 So, using these 
techniques can be risky to long-term goals if not managed properly. 
The Brook study provides confidence that application of the Fernandez 
and Rainey factors for sustained changed are valid for applying to the DoD and 
the FIAR Plan.  
D. FIAR PLAN SUSTAINABILITY RISK ASSESSMENT 
 The question of whether or not the FIAR Plan can be sustained through 
completion is not a question that can be answered with any amount of certainty. 
There are too many variables that can affect the success of a change strategy. 
Also, the importance, or criticality, of these variables will change over time, and in 
an indeterminate manner. Therefore, it is better to examine the problem by 
evaluating the Fernandez/Rainey success factors for sustained changed in terms 
of the risk DoD currently has that they can satisfy the factor. 
 Table 5-1 below is a scorecard that rates each of the sustainability factors 
in terms of the risk they reveal to sustaining the FIAR Plan over the long-term. 
This is a subjective evaluation of the factors based on observations of the DoD 
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FIAR Plan Sustainability Scorecard 
    
 Factor Risk Support Elements 
    
1 Ensure The Need Med Congressional Legislation (Law) 
   GAO Reports 
   DoD IG Audits 
   OSD Priority 
    
2 Provide A Plan Low FIAR Plan 
   Components FIPs 
   Enterprise Transition Plan/SFIS 
    
3 Internal Support Med Component FIPs 
   ASMC 
   CDFM Certifications 
   Component FM Training 
    
4 Top Management Support High Political/Civilian/Military  
   Leardership Structure 
    
5 External Support High Operational Side of Services 
   Congress 
   GAO 
   OMB 
    
6 Provide Resources Med Budget Funding For FIAR/FIPs 
    
7 Institutionalize Change Med Size of Organization 
   Reliance on Components 
   Incremental Pace 
    
8 Comprehensive Change Med FIAR Plan Relation With BTA 
Table 5-1. FIAR Plan Sustainability Scorecard 
Source: Author 
 
1. Ensure the Need – Medium Risk 
 The need for financial management reform and the ability to produce 
auditable financial statements has been expressed repeatedly by many different 
sources. Congress has expressed the need through the various legislation they 
have passed over the years. These laws carry more than just the desires the 
Congress and the public at large which they represent. They are requirements 
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that must be met. Thus, there is no shortage of political legitimacy for the 
change. Additionally, members of Congress have held numerous public 
committee hearings investigating the issues around financial management reform 
in the DoD.123  
 The GAO publishes an almost continuous stream of reports related to 
financial management in the Department. Over 58 reports were released by the 
GAO with financial management within the DoD as part of the issue.124 Most 
include the need to improve financial processes and systems, and 
recommendations to increase the likelihood of auditability. In many public 
appearances in the past few years, the Comptroller General David Walker stated 
he could not verify the soundness of the U.S. Government’s financial position 
until the DoD was able to receive a comprehensive audit. 
 The DoD IG also publishes reports every year stating the need to make 
progress in financial management reform. The most visible of these is the 
Inspector General’s statement included in the DoD’s Performance and 
Accountability Report. For the FY2005 report he stated, “The Department faces 
financial management challenges that are complex, long-standing, and pervade 
virtually all its business operations, affecting the ability to provide reliable, timely, 
and useful financial and managerial data to support operating, budgeting, and 
policy decisions.”125 The GAO and DoD IG represent external sources that 
reinforce the need of change.  
 All of the above represent using political windows of opportunity for 
communicating a need.126 So, the word is getting out. But, the question 
becomes, how is this information being received by DoD? There are risks with 
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ensuring the need for financial management reform remains a focus. This is 
because of the mixed signals many of the above entities make. While Congress 
has made auditable statements a mandated requirement since 1990, no one has 
been fired for failing to receive an unqualified opinion. The DoD also receives its 
funding every year. While Congress may enact cuts to the proposed budget, they 
are not due to non-compliance with CFO Act legislation. The main focus of DoD 
and Congressional leaders is with policy and operational issues, not financial 
management. There is no apparent penalty for failure which provides an 
incentive to do nothing, or as little as possible. 
 People associated with the DoD have been hearing about this need for 
audited statements for over 16 years. The message could be lost in what has 
become a broken record. Congress still passes a budget every year, and 
everyone still got paid. Tanks still rolled, planes still flew, and ships still sailed. 
Every supplemental budget request was passed. It is not hard to see why many 
would question the need for compliance. 
 Ensuring the need for the FIAR Plan will require more than just the CFO 
Act. It is going to require an extensive strategic communication plan.127 Every 
target audience will receive the message differently because of the differences 
on their desires and perceived benefits from the plan. Therefore, managers 
associated with the FIAR Plan must be flexible and cognizant of the methods, 
media, and presenters they use. This is an element which must be continuously 
emphasized. 
2. Provide a Plan – Low Risk 
 Fernandez and Rainey describe the goal to “plan strategically but 
pragmatically.”128 The FIAR Plan seems to fit that description. It lays out clear, 
systematic intermediate goals (key milestones) on the path to achieving an 
overarching objective (an unqualified opinion on the DoD consolidated financial 
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statements). It leverages two important elements. The first is the production of 
DoD-wide business standards through the ETP, and the financial standards 
provided by SFIS. The second element is the component FIPs. The FIAR Plan 
does not attempt to redo the progress already made by the components. It 
provides a framework for the different components to focus their efforts toward 
more common goals. The FIAR Plan is but one part of other business and 
governmental transition plans. It may  
3. Build Internal Support – Medium Risk 
 A major risk with internal support amongst the financial management 
community is a perception that the FIAR Plan may be just a “governmental 
fashion statement.”129 Internal leaders, managers, and employees need to be 
assured that this plan is more than window dressing. Internal support relates 
closely to the first two factors. Leaders must continuously verify the need, and 
provide a workable plan so personnel internal to the process believe that their 
work brings meaningful change.   
 One useful tool to aid in the bolstering of the internal support of the DoD 
financial management community is through the American Society of Military 
Comptrollers (ASMC). ASMC is a non-profit professional organization for DoD 
and Coast Guard financial managers. It has over 18,000 members and 140 
chapters world-wide130. Every year the organization holds a Professional 
Development Institute (PDI) Conference to provide common training and 
education opportunities to its members. At the 2006 PDI Conference held in San 
Diego, CA, 108 workshops were conducted. Of these, 25 or 23% dealt with the 
FIAR Plan, business transformation, or auditablilty.131  
 In addition to the PDI, ASMC publishes a quarterly journal, The Armed 
Forces Comptroller, which shares information related to DoD financial issues with 
members. The last four issues of the magazine (Summer 2005-Spring 2006) 
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contained no less than 12 articles, written by DoD financial managers, about 
business transformation issues or financial improvement plans throughout the 
DoD. 
 One of the characteristics of the FIAR Plan, as has been noted before, is 
the use of independent component FIPs. This has led to some duplication of 
effort and what might appear as an inefficient use of resources. For example, the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force have each made separate contracts with different 
companies for consulting, software, and hardware. Had the decision been made 
to formulate one DoD-wide transition plan, it is likely the process would have 
been mired in inter-service negotiations to come up with a compromise plan for 
all organizations. Such a plan may have ended up being less than optimal for all 
of the services. By allowing each service to maintain its own plan and see to its 
own unique needs, the FIAR Plan has built-in internal support by widening the 
scope of participation.132 It’s not just a DoD plan, it is the component’s plan. By 
creating standards and focusing direction (telling the components what needs to 
be done, giving them the standards they need to conform to), but not dictating 
how it is to be done, the end products should be done better and faster than if 
one composite plan had been negotiated from scratch. 
4. Top Management Support – High Risk 
 The issue of top management support of the FIAR Plan is very 
complicated, yet critical to success. The December 2005 FIAR Plan stated, 
“Senior leaders throughout the Department are committed to implementing the 
FIAR Plan.”133 Which senior leaders are being referred to? The DoD is 
comprised of three different leadership structures; political, military, and career 
civilian. Each has different cultures, incentives, and accountability; all experience 
high rates of turnover.  
 Evidence supports the notion that the political leadership is behind the 
Plan. In November 2005, then Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon 
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England, issued a memorandum concerning the soon-to-be released FIAR Plan. 
He stated, “Support from every DoD community, both functional and financial, is 
essential. I expect you to make the development and implementation of this plan 
a priority so we can realize these benefits as soon as possible.” Note that he did 
personally underline “a priority” when he signed the memo. Congressional 
testimony and discussions with DoD financial managers seem to confirm that 
political leadership is indeed supportive of the efforts.  
With the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld following the 2006 Congressional 
elections, the status of political support from within the DoD becomes 
questionable. It remains to be seen who will stay in their positions and finish the 
term, and what people in key positions to influence support will leave. It is also 
uncertain as to how committed the next Secretary of Defense will be to the FIAR 
Plan and its initiatives. 
 Support by civilian and military leadership is also questionable. In 
interviews with financial managers directly associated with implementation of the 
FIAR Plan, the view was expressed that support among civilian and military 
leaders does not match that of the political side. This is especially so amongst 
the uniformed community. The DoD operates in a budget accounting world. As 
one financial manager said,”…the major focus is on getting money for programs, 
not tracking how the money is used.” As the programs under the FIAR Plan 
progress, proprietary and managerial accounting capabilities will be added to the 
working environment. This is going to require a change in how senior managers 
work and think. Financial managers have noted that there is resistance to that. 
 In 2009 there will be a new administration in the White House. The 
appointed leaders of the next administration will have their own agenda they will 
wish to engage. Financial management reform efforts may or may not be one the 
priorities. If key DoD civilian and military leaders that will be part of the transition 
process do not transmit the importance of the FIAR Plan or their desire to keep 
the program going, then it will likely lose the support required to continue.  
 The Comptroller General, David Walker, has been campaigning for the 
DoD to adopt a Chief Management Officer (CMO) to lead the business 
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transformation efforts for the Department. In the Fernandez/Rainey research, 
such a person would be referred to as a change agent or idea champion, and 
studies support the idea that such a person can help lead to a successful 
change.134 Walker suggests that this position be an executive level appointee 
with a term to last 5 to 7 years. Furthermore, this position, “…would not assume 
the responsibilities of the undersecretaries of defense, the service secretaries, or 
other DoD officials for the day-to-day management of the department.”135  
The CMO, as suggested by the GAO, would be a policy maker, not an 
implementer. Furthermore, a position with a 7-year term would almost guarantee 
the official would, at some point, function under a different administration or even 
a different political party. Policy suggested from a CMO which is at conflict with 
the Secretary of Defense will likely not be implemented due to lack of authority. 
The risk is that all top management support from those with actual authority 
would be lost. 
5.  Build External Support – High Risk 
 Support from political overseers is another key to making change 
sustainable in the public sector. As mentioned before, it is from the political side 
that mandates originate and resources are acquired. Elected officials, both in the 
executive and legislative sides, have the power to promote the desired change, 
or kill it.  
 Congress appears to be supportive at the time. However, members of the 
Senate Subcommittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs seem to 
be somewhat skeptical of the timelines published in the FIAR Plan.136 How the 
members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and 
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Appropriations Committees feel about the FIAR Plan is unknown.137 But, it is 
through those four committees that many of the DoD mandates are generated 
and resources budgeted. Those committees and their members are also where 
much of the DoD leadership concentrates its attention. Adequate political support 
does not necessarily require all of the leadership. Moore states, “…managers do 
not need political unanimity to have a successful strategy: all they need is 
enough political support to supply the money, authority, and people required to 
implement the strategy.”138 Thus, it is important to ensure buy-in from members 
of those key committees. 139 
 With the 2006 Congressional elections, both houses changed leadership 
to the Democratic Party. How that will affect political support of the FIAR Plan 
from Congress is uncertain.  
 Support from the non-financial leaders amongst the services is 
questionable. FIAR Plan leaders in the component services generally expressed 
difficulty in getting military leaders outside of the financial management 
community to recognize the importance of the financial improvement, its possible 
benefits, or the state of current financial systems. This is somewhat 
understandable considering operational leaders and support staff are engaged in 
fighting an actual war. Non-financial issues tend to take priority. But, these 
commands are the ones that are actually generating the financial data and 
making decisions based on those current financial systems which have been 
called into question. Mark Easton, the Director of the Navy’s Office of Financial 
Operations, sums up the problem many financial managers face, “The financial 
information that appears on the statements or reports comes from our operations 
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– not just from the comptroller.”140 At a time of increasing financial constraints, 
increasing operational requirements, and increasing requirements for 
accountability, everyone in the Department should have a vested interest in 
seeing improvements made to financial systems and information reporting.  
 With regard to the previous factor (Top Management Support) and the fact 
that there will be a change in the executive within the next couple of years, 
external support can play a major role. Congress and the GAO have the ability to 
use political pressure to persuade the next administration to sustain the FIAR 
Plan.  
6. Providing Resources – Medium Risk 
  Significant change is never free. The FIAR Plan is no exception. Billions 
of dollars are likely to be required over the next several years to see the program 
through to conclusion. No estimate of the total cost of the FIAR Plan or the 
component FIPs have been given. $4.2 billion was budgeted in FY2006 for all 
DoD transformation programs.141 The December 2005 FIAR Plan stated that 
funding was sufficient for FY2006 KMPs. Future funding requirements would be 
addressed through the budget process. 
 Funding for the FIAR Plan is a little more complicated than the Plan 
states. The component’s Financial Improvement Plans are funded through their 
own component budget. While funding was adequate for FY2006 and FY2007142, 
there is no guarantee those levels will be maintained for the life of the FIAR Plan. 
Additionally, the individual components may, at some point in the future, lower 
the funding priority for their FIAR Plan activities. This would put at risk completion 
of FIAR Plan elements in a timely manner.  
 One possible solution discussed with the financial managers was to fund 
all FIAR Plan KMPs centrally through OSD. Centralized funding would reduce the 
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risk that funding would be cut for other component priorities. But, this has 
inherent risks as well. It essentially removes ownership of the FIAR Plan from the 
components. With that is the possible loss of internal support of the program. 
Most of the financial managers felt it was better to keep funding through the 
component budgets for flexibility and to maintain ownership. It is a trade-off that 
mitigates risk at the component level, but adds risk to comprehensive change.  
7. Institutionalize Change – Medium Risk 
 The institutionalizing of a change process requires the organization to 
permanently change its behavior. This is no small task in an organization as 
large as the DoD. Updating systems and processes is part of the formula for 
making this happen. But, in the end, the change must be made in the people 
involved with financial management. And, this includes people that may not see 
themselves as financial managers.  
 The FIAR Plan is heavily dependent on the individual components to 
incorporate changes into their culture. Thus, this factor is subject to the same 
vulnerability as the others; that individual components lose focus on the Plan, 
and permanent changes are not incorporated within their organization. Financial 
visibility for the DoD is reliant on all components and agencies being successful 
in transformation and efforts and seeing those changes sustained over time. 
 Fernandez and Rainey make a point that the pace of change is important. 
But, they do not state with certainty whether changes should come rapidly or 
incrementally. There is research that supports both methods.143 The FIAR Plan 
makes it clear that this will be an incremental process.144 Much of that is driven 
by practical realities. There is much to be done in order to see all DoD financial 
systems reach a point where they can be audited. There are simply not enough 
resources available in a short period of time to be applied to the problem and 
reach a satisfactory conclusion. This is a process which will take time. But, 
Fernandez and Rainey warn, “Small-scale or gradual implementation may pose 
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more of challenge in the public sector than in business, since frequent shifts in 
political leadership and short tenures for political appointees can cause 
commitment for change to wane.”145 Again it is worth noting that the FIAR Plan is 
an 11 year plan developed under an administration that has less than two years 
left in office. If significant changes are not institutionalized by 2009, the FIAR 
Plan may come apart in the out-years. 
8. Pursue Comprehensive Change – Medium Risk 
 Fernandez and Rainey refer to comprehensive change as that which 
brings the subsystems of an organization into alignment.146 As an enabler of 
financial management change, this may be a strength of the FIAR Plan. Use of 
the FIAR Committee, the FIAR Planning Tool, and the FIAR Directorate to 
coordinate the efforts of the various agencies can help to ensure goals are 
aligned, and standards are being implemented across the components. 
Additionally, the FIAR Plan is designed to integrate the efforts made for financial 
improvements into the other business transformation efforts being undertaken 
through the BTA.  
E.  CONCLUSION 
 The Fernandez/Rainey factors for successful change are not hard and fast 
requirements. Satisfaction of every factor is no guarantee of success. Likewise, 
not being able to satisfy them is no guarantee of failure. But, with the backing of 
the Brook study, it might be inferred that support of top management, internal 
support, external support, and the provision of resources are the most critical. 
With that, the evaluation of the risks leads to the conclusion that the FIAR Plan is 
at a high risk of not being sustainable for the long-term. 
 Change is not an easy process. Changing the financial systems and 
processes is going to be a long and difficult task. But, having used the 
Fernandez/Rainey framework as a model, it becomes obvious that people are an 
integral part of the change process. Given the extended amount of time people 
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(March/April 2006), 16. 
146 Ibid. 
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have been dealing with the issue of financial management reform verified 
through audited financial statements, and the political realities of an upcoming 
election, there could be problems making this plan work. The change in people 
(i.e., the change in culture) needs to come before changes in systems. Due to 
the large changes that are happening with the political environment, the time for 
that to take effect is drawing short. 
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VI.  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FURTHER STUDY 
A.  SUMMARY 
 The sequence of events which led to the formation and release of the 
FIAR Plan in late 2005 is long and complicated. It started over two decades ago 
a series of laws passed by Congress intended to improve financial management 
within the federal government. The DoD struggled with compliance. Efforts to 
improve financial systems and achieve auditability were mainly focused with the 
individual components. 
 The Friedman Report of 2001 gave DoD leadership a better 
understanding of the of the problems associated with financial management 
within the Department. They also had recommendations to tackle the issues 
using a comprehensive approach. This led to several initiatives that eventually 
evolved into the BTA, which is leading the transformation efforts of all of the 
business areas the Department. Critical to the success of a comprehensive 
approach was the development of department-wide standards to which the 
individual components could conform. Standardization programs such as the 
SFIS are designed to meet those requirements. The FIAR Plan is executed by 
the USD(C) and is the enabler for DoD transformation with respect to the BTA’s 
Business Enterprise Priority of Financial Visibility. 
 The FIAR Plan uses a prioritized and incremental approach for financial 
improvements with collaboration from the DoD components. Priorities are set by 
the FIAR Committee and the plan is monitored by the FIAR Directorate. It 
leverages previous work done by continuing to use the component’s own 
financial improvement plans.  
The FIAR Plan focuses the efforts of the components through the use of 
focus areas. These are Military Equipment, Real Property, Medicare-Eligible 
Retiree Health Care Fund, Environmental Liabilities, Inventory and Operating 
Materials and Supplies, Accounts Payable, and Accounts Receivable. It also puts  
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in place a systematic process for the components to use to prepare for their 
independent audits. According to projections, the DoD should be able to achieve 
an unqualified opinion on its consolidated statements by 2017.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
 The use of the academic frameworks provides a different, if not unique, 
perspective on the evaluation of a DoD program. The Moore Model of public 
value creation stresses the critical need for a strategy to integrate politics, 
substance, and administration. These are represented as forces; Up, Out, and 
Down, respectively. The FIAR Plan does achieve this integration. Summing the 
findings of value creation: 
• Up – It sets the roadmap for compliance with Congressional 
mandates. It also tracks milestones to demonstrate that progress is 
being made. The FIAR Plan has been viewed as a positive step by 
Congress, the GAO, DoD IG, and OMB.  
• Out – For the public the FIAR Plan provides a visible demonstration 
that the DoD is working to improve its financial systems. Eventually, 
with the unqualified opinion, it will provide an independent 
assessment that financial processes are working well. The value 
created is improved confidence in the conduct of the organization. 
Thus, the auditor’s opinion on the financial statements is important. 
For the DoD components, the financial improvements made will 
improve the information used for decision making.  
• Down – The FIAR Plan adds value for the financial management 
community by providing a common framework from which to make 
their improvements. Accountability is more visible across the 
components with the use of the FIAR Planning Tool and reporting. 
It also provides the systematic process for preparing for audit. 
While the FIAR Plan does create the value, as stated above, there are 
potential further benefits. These are: 
• Working with political leadership to take advantage of future 
financial visibility; 
• Improved visibility to changes in the Plan so overseers have less 
reason to question the sincerity or execution of the Plan; 
• Seeking progress metrics that non-financial managers can 
understand and appreciate; 
• Make the relevance of financial information just as important as the 
timeliness, accuracy, and reliability of it; 
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• Including the transformation of financial managers as people to 
handle the transformation of systems and processes. 
The Fernandez and Rainey success factors for change in a public 
organization offer an opportunity to examine the risk that the change process the 
FIAR Plan represents could be sustained over the long-term. The eight success 
factors are: 
• Ensure top management commitment; 
• Build external support; 
• Ensure the need; 
• Build internal support; 
• Provide resources; 
• Institutionalize change; 
• Pursue comprehensive change;  
• Provide a plan. 
Findings indicate that top management support and external support are 
high risk areas. This is due to the questionable support from non-politically 
appointed leadership, especially from those with non-financial backgrounds. 
Additionally, with the upcoming elections in 2008 there is no guarantee that the 
next administration will have the same priority with regard to financial reform. The 
effects of the recent 2006 Congressional election are uncertain. Without support 
from the current civilian and military leadership, the risk of a priority shift 
increases.  
The next five factors were medium risk areas. The FIAR Plan’s inclusion 
of component FIPs helps to ensure support from within and encourage the 
changes required. But it does risk reprioritization at the component level which 
could upset the Plan at the macro level. 
Using the Brook (2001) study, support of top management, internal 
support, external support, and the provision of resources are the most critical 
elements. Efforts focused in these areas would likely have the greatest impact on 
sustainability. Additionally, these factors require that a focus on people is critical 
for sustained changes to succeed.  
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This thesis began by asking two questions. First, does the FIAR Plan 
create value, in the sense that it helps to meet desires and expectations of 
stakeholders concerned? This analysis indicates that it does. However, there are 
opportunities to increase that perceived value to the various stakeholders, as 
noted above. The Moore Model implies that value creation is an active and not a 
static process.  
To the second question; if it does create value, then can the changes 
required of the FIAR Plan be sustained over the long-term? This analysis 
indicates based on the Fernandez/Rainey success factors that there is a 
considerable amount of risk that it might not. The analysis also showed that there 
are many elements present that promote sustainability. These include 
established political mandates, a viable plan which is currently funded, and an 
improving (although not institutionalized) awareness of the importance and 
benefits of upgrading financial systems, processes, and people.   
It is worth noting that these two elements, value and sustainability, are 
mutually supportive. Those activities which create value will promote 
sustainment. Likewise, those activities which ensure sustainment will increase 
value. This correlation can also be applied to the two models used for this 
analysis. Moore’s UP direction (Political System) matches to the 
Fernandez/Rainey factors of ensuring the need, external support, comprehensive 
change and provision of resources. Value created in this direction will aid DoD 
FM increased political legitimacy and financial support. Interactive involvement 
with political authorizers can be critical to long-term success as was seen with 
the New Zealand government’s change in accounting systems.147 
Moore’s OUT direction (Receivers and Payers of Services) aligns with the 
Fernandez/Rainey factors of ensuring the need, external support and 
comprehensive change. It is worth noting again that the root of value is in the 
perceived desires of the individual. A successful plan requires having knowledge 
                                            
147 Joanne Lye, Hector Perera, and Asheq Rahman. “The Evolution of Accruals-Based 
Crown (Government) Financial Statements in New Zealand.” Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal. (2005), 800. 
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of what value needs to be created before making the change.148 An 
understanding of how these stakeholders use financial information is critical to 
providing the right value. With that, support will follow. 
Moore’s DOWN direction (Organization) aligns with the Fernandez/Rainey 
factors of ensuring the need, providing a plan, internal support, top management 
support, institutionalize change and comprehensive change. What becomes 
clearer when combining the two models in this direction is the importance of the 
human element in creating value and sustained change. Achieving the value 
potential UP and OUT requires the organization to make sustained changes 
within itself. This is as much a leadership and education challenge as it is a 
system and process challenge.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 One of the near-term objectives in the FIAR Plan is the audit of the Marine 
Corps financial statements. The Marine Corps is smallest of the uniformed 
services and it should be the first to go through the FIAR Plan’s assertion 
process for an audit. It is scheduled to go through the Validation Phase in FY07. 
If successful, they may be able to perform an audit in FY08.149 As the Marine 
Corps goes through this process, it provides an opportunity to observe and report 
on how it does. Such a study may highlight challenges faced which might affect 
other agencies, and factors for success. 
 As noted in the findings, the human element (which includes education, 
training, motivation, incentives, and promotion of innovative thinking) is critical to 
the success of the FIAR Plan. Further study is warranted into how to incorporate 
a human capital strategy into the FIAR Plan and FIPs. An unqualified opinion on 
audits is one step towards achieving relevant financial information. But, it is no 
guarantee that it will be used. The users of financial information need to be 
prepared to take advantage of it. 
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 A detailed analysis of the individual component FIPs was beyond the 
scope of this study. While the FIAR Plan provides guidance and direction at the 
top level, it is the responsibility of the components to make the improvements 
happen. Management challenges are political, fiscal, and very technical in 
nature. Each of the component FIPs would be topic-rich for future studies. While 
USD(C) works to ensure the information traveling up through the components is 
standardized; the methods for achieving that are different among the FIPs. That 
presents the opportunity for comparative studies. Additionally, there are highly 
technical problems with systems integration, software configurations, and 
information flow which can be studied. 
 As was noted in Chapter IV with the complete Moore Model (Figure 4-5), 
there are forces outside the direct influence of management, such as informal 
networks and the media. These forces can either be a vulnerability or an 
opportunity. Further study, such as the mapping of informal communication and 
influence networks from the FM community to the various stakeholders might 
indicate how to exploit these areas. Marketing research into traditional and non-
tradition media may help improve communication to stakeholders.  
 While most of the DoD agencies are still working to obtain unqualified 
opinions on audit, there are five that have already achieved that mark. They are 
noted in Chapter III. These agencies might be good candidates for case studies 
which document the factors which led to their success. Such case studies might 
provide positive and applicable insights for other agencies to use in their own 
financial improvement programs.  
 Among the comments from financial managers in the interviews was an 
acknowledgment that auditing standards, while stabilizing, continue to change. 
This has been a challenge for the financial managers to deal with. Changing 
standards was one of the major issues brought up in the Friedman Report as a 
barrier to financial improvement.150 Further investigation was not possible for this 
study. However, this is a subject that might warrant a closer look. How have 
changing standards and requirements from FASAB and the GAO affected the                                             
150 DoD Report, “Transforming Department of Defense Financial Management: A Strategy 
for Change” (13 April 2001) 4-9. 
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ability of the DoD to make improvements? What is driving those changes? What 
issues are left to be resolved? Those are questions that could not be answered 
for this report, but might have a material impact on how quickly and effectively 
the DoD is able to attain a full audit.  
 Financial information is used differently by different stakeholders. Further 
study is warranted in how stakeholders use financial information. Such a study, 
or series of studies, would help to identify what is perceived as relevant 
information for users. This would help to tailor services and programs to 
maximize the value delivered by financial managers. It would aid in identifying 
opportunities where education and training might improve how financial 
information is employed. It would also provide a basis for examining how 
financial information could be used differently as new financial systems are 
brought online.  
 The Moore Model was a useful tool to examine the value to stakeholders 
of the FIAR Plan. It is a framework which may be helpful for examining other 
programs, strategies, or organizations within the DoD.  
 The Fernandez/Rainey factors for successful change offered an 
interesting framework to assess the long-term sustainability risk of the FIAR Plan. 
While the factors were derived from previous studies, there is no definition of 
what constitutes successful achievement of the factor. This is an opportunity for 
study to derive quantifiable measures that could be applied to the factors. This 
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